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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
(Including standards of review and supporting authority.) 
The following are the issues that appear to be presented by Appellant's brief: 
1. The trial court having denied both parties respective cross motions for 
summary judgment and Brown's Motion 1o Strike Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen and having 
required that the case proceed to trial, having heard the evidence and having made its 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and having entered a final judgment thereon, does 
the trial court's prior refusal to strike Jorgensen's affidavit and denial of summary 
judgment in favor of Brown, against whom the final judgment was rendered, present an 
appealable issue? The denial of a motion for summary judgment is not a final appealable 
order. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1997) and Jensen v. 
Nielsen, 447 P.2d 906 (Utah 1968).1 
2. Since Brown's appeal appears to challenge the findings of fact made by the 
trial court but fails to marshall the supporting evidence, will the reviewing court review 
the trial court's findings of fact? If an appellant fails to marshall the evidence and then 
"ferret out a fatal flaw" therein sufficient to convince the appellate court that the findings 
1
 Only an appeal from the granting of a final summary judgment presents either the 
question of whether the trial court erred in determining there was no genuine material 
issue of fact for trial or the question of whether the trial court made an incorrect ruling of 
law which the appellate court reviews under a standard of correctness, according no 
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions. Maoris & Associates v. Images & 
Attitude, Inc., 941 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1997). 
are clearly erroneous, the appellate court assumes the record supports the trial court's 
findings. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), Awinc Corp. v. Simonsen, 112 P.3d 
1228 (Utah App. 2005) and West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
3. Should the trial court have modified the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
by ruling that Brown could acquire 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's unimproved rural property 
by proving only that Brown personally believed Brown's property extended clear up the 
hill in back of his property up to an old livestock fence above an irrigation ditch and that 
Jorgensen/predecessors did not affirmatively protest whatever use Brown had been 
making of the portion of Jorgensen's property lying below the old fence? The trial 
court's conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness. Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 
(Utah 1991). 
4. After the trial and the court ruled title should be quieted in Jorgensen, should 
the trial court have vacated its findings and ruling that Brown's evidence was insufficient 
to establish the elements of boundary by acquiescence and have granted Brown a 
prescriptive easement of some sort concerning Jorgensen's 6.94 acres, notwithstanding 
no prescriptive easement theory had been recognized or tried by express or implied 
consent of the parties? The trial court's application of Rule 15(b) and determination of 
whether an issue was tried by express or applied consent are legal questions reviewed for 
correctness. Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998) and Fibro Trust, Inc. v. 
Brahman Financial Inc., 91A P.2d 288 (Utah 1999). 
5. Jorgensen having filed no post trial memorandum of costs, does the statement 
in the judgment that "Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court as 
may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant 
to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure" present an appealable issue for Brown? 
There is no appellate court jurisdiction over an appeal from an interlocutory order not 
constituting a final judgment. R.H.D. v. S.F., 969 P.2d 947 (Utah App. 1998). 
6. Brown not having complained to the trial court concerning the (harmless) 
statement in the judgment quieting title to Jorgensen's property in Jorgensen free and 
clear of all claims of Brown "and of all claims of all other persons who may claim by, 
through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or either of them," is any 
issue pertaining thereto presented for appeal? To preserve an issue for review on appeal, 
the issue must have been presented to the trial court. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 
(Utah App. 1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs/Appellants Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown, "Brown", and 
Defendant/Appellee Lee Jorgensen, "Jorgensen", own adjoining parcels of rural property 
in Summit County, Utah. Brown owns approximately 17 acres. Jorgensen owns 
approximately 195 acres, mostly up the mountain from the Brown parcel, which 
Jorgensen and an associate purchased for investment in 1979. 
Brown made claim to 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property lying below part of an 
old hillside fence which ran north out of a canyon, a northwest fork of which then ran 
northwesterly above Brown's property about 1900 feet along a hillside through sagebrush 
above an irrigation ditch on Jorgensen's property, asserting entitlement on the basis of the 
judicial doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Brown's trial evidence was essentially that Brown believed Brown owned all 
property lying downhill from the old hillside fence and had used that property for grazing 
and other use without objection from Jorgensen/predecessors for many years. Brown had 
a survey made of Brown's property in 1971 when Brown took title which showed all 
Brown owned was about 17 acres but Brown testified he did not understand it showed his 
property line was not the old fence line and testified that the old fence was erected by his 
father in the 1940s and that he believed it was erected on Brown's property line. 
Jorgensen's trial evidence essentially consisted of the recorded chain of title and 
surveys which showed there were no gaps or overlaps in the parties respective adjoining 
property legal descriptions; that in 1978 Jorgensen had been shown where the actual then 
staked property line existed below the irrigation ditch before he purchased the property; 
that Jorgensen had entered his property several times along an old road along the 
irrigation ditch assuming both were on his property and without which access to his 
(mountain) property he would not have purchased the property; that Jorgensen never had 
understood or believed the old fence was a boundary line and regarded the old leaning 
hillside fence posts as meaningless. 
No evidence was presented as to how Tracy Land & Livestock Company, a 
Corporation (R. 170), Jorgensen's principal predecessor in interest, considered the fence 
or whether Tracy even knew of its existence. 
The trial court determined that Brown's evidence did not show both owners had 
acquiesced in the fence as a boundary line and entered judgment quieting title in favor of 
Jorgensen. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Brown's complaint, seeking 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence, was filed May 30, 2001 (R. 1-5). 
On June 19, 2001, Jorgensen filed an Answer and Counterclaim seeking to quiet 
Jorgensen's title to the 6.94 acre parcel and a judgment requiring Brown to remove the 
new 1994-1995 hillside fence Brown had erected on the old fence line and a wood fence 
Brown had constructed on a portion of the 6.94 acres along the county highway which 
obstructed entry to the road paralleling the irrigation ditch which provided access on and 
into Jorgensen's property. (R. 7-14) 
On December 21, 2001, Brown filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 59-60). 
On January 22, 2002, Jorgensen filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 111-112). 
On February 20, 2002, Brown filed a Motion to Strike an Affidavit of Lee 
Jorgensen (R. 113-120) which Jorgensen had filed in support of Jorgensen's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
235-236). 
By Ruling and Order filed April 6, 2002 the trial court (Judge Robert K. Hilder) 
denied Brown's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen and denied both motions 
for summary judgment. (R. 281-283) 
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 Judge Hilder's April 6, 2002 Ruling and Order granted partial summary judgment, 
stating "plaintiff satisfies element (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, as follows: If the fact finder determines that elements (I) and (ii), are met, 
plaintiffs will not be required to prove the remaining elements at trial." (R. 281-283). On 
May 7, 2002, Jorgensen filed a Motion for Clarification of Ruling (the April 6, 2002 
Ruling and Order) and Determination of Scope of Relevant Evidence (R. 285-266). By 
minute entry dated June 20, 2002, Judge Hilder ruled that the evidentiary issues raised 
were more properly the subject of motions in limine or issues best raised at trial and that 
under the court's April 6, 2002 ruling and order, the fact finder would not have to find 
that Jorgensen failed to raise any objection but such issue would "not even be reached 
unless the fact finder is persuaded that there was something to object to; for example, a 
visible and continuously existing line, and that the line, if it existed, was acquiesced in as 
the boundary" (R. 311-312). On May 28, 2003, Jorgensen filed a Motion in Limine and 
for Determination of Legal Relevance of Deeds and Maps/Other Evidence of Deed Lines 
and for Other Relief. (R. 333-335). By Ruling and Order filed September 22, 2003 (R. 
424-431) the trial court (Judge Bruce C. Lubeck) ruled: 1) Inasmuch as both parties 
concede the record title reflects Jorgensen is the owner of the disputed property, Brown 
had the burden of proof as the party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 2) The burden 
of proof was a preponderance of the evidence and not a burden to prove boundary by 
acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. 3) There was insufficient basis for the 
court to disallow Brown's testimony about what he assumed his (deceased) father 
believed about the fence which was erected in the 1940s hence the court would consider 
objections to specific statements during Brown's trial testimony. 4) Notwithstanding, 
Jorgensen's record legal title to the property, since Judge Hilder had previously decided 
as a matter of law that the boundary was established for a long period of time and 
established by adjoining land owners with the only remaining issues for trial being 
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or boundaries and mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, Brown's evidence in support of the latter two 
prongs of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence would be decided at trial. 5) Brown's 
boundary by acquiescence claim was not barred by Section 25-5-1 of Utah's statute of 
frauds because the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence supercedes the statute of frauds, 
notwithstanding decisional case law has not specifically addressed the impact of the 
statute of frauds on the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 6) The Section 78-12-7 
U.C.A. presumption that Jorgensen possessed his property and that any use thereof by 
Brown was under and in subordination to Jorgensen's legal title is solely applicable to 
adverse possession claims and not to a boundary by acquiescence case. 
Following the trial court's disposition of subsequent motions (see footnote 2) the 
case was tried before Judge Bruce C. Lubeck. 
DISPOSITION IN COURT BELOW 
Following a bench trial on March 31 and April 1, 2004, Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
made and entered a very detailed Memorandum Decision discussing the law and 
containing twelve separately numbered findings of fact and eight separately numbered 
conclusions of law. (R. 481-491, Addendum II hereto) The court found that 
Brown/predecessors had been using Jorge risen's property below the old fence for 
approximately fifty-three years since Brown's father erected the fence and that the basic 
issue for the court was whether the use made of Jorgensen's property by 
Brown/predecessors amounted to acquiring the property under the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence. 
The court ruled that to show mutual acquiescence, Brown had the burden of 
proving that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line as a demarcation 
between the properties; that both parties had knowledge of the existence of a line as a 
boundary line and must have recognized and treated an observable line, such as a fence, 
as the boundary dividing properties, and ruled that mere conversation between the parties 
evidencing an ongoing dispute or an unwillingness of one to accept the line refutes the 
allegation of mutual acquiescence; that occupation of land up to a fence is not sufficient 
if the owner does not acquiesce in the fence as a boundary and that evidence of 
knowledge of recorded deeds and instruments were not relevant in a boundary by 
acquiescence case. 
The court made detailed extensive findings of fact (R. 484-487). For clarity, 
Jorgensen here separates these into separate sentences as follows: 
Brown had repaired and replaced some of the fence as recently as the mid-1990s. 
I 'he fence was observable since construction. tl lougl 1 at v arioi is poii its it i i lay ha\ e been 
leaning down or covered by sagebrush. When Brown took title to some of what had been 
the Brown family property in 1971, Brown had built a house on the 17 acres then deeded 
to Brown. The fence was always considered by Brown to be tl le boundary line Browi I, 
before building his house, commissioned a survey by Bush & Gudgell which showed that 
Brown's property line was not the fence. Brown was legally aware of the metes and 
bounds survey but did not understand it showed a property line different from the fence 
line. Brown's subjective intent and belief was that the fence erected by his father in the 
1940s was Brown's property line. Jorgensen's property is largely barren, hilly and 
mostly sagebrush. Brown and his family had used the property below the fence to graze 
cattle and sheep 1 1 lere was ai i ii rigation ditch which Bi own had i i laintained and 
improved below on the downhill side of the fence. Brown caused some of the ditch to be 
covered and installed culverts. Below the ditch there was a drop-off towards Brown's 
property. Neither Jorgensen nor his predecessors 1 lad attempted to i ise or occup •} t l l e 
property below the fence line which ran approximately 1900 feet above Brown's 
property. If the property below the fence was considered as belonging to Brown, such 
would add 6.94 acres to Plaintiffs 17 acre parcel. The irrigation ditch within the 6.94 
acres originated at the (Weber) river and flowed northward downhill, towards and under 
the county road. In July 1999 Jorgensen had written a note to Brown telling Brown that 
Brown had built a fence on Jorgensen's property and that it should be removed. 
Jorgensen had commissioned a survey shortly after that contact which was consistent 
with Brown's 1971 metes and bounds survey. Brown was originally told in 1994 that the 
true property line probably ran through his home but that was an error and the true line 
was west of the home erected by Brown. Brown refused to remove the fence, filing an 
action to quiet title, asserting the land was owned by Brown under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Jorgensen purchased his 195 acres in 1971 as an investment, having inspected the 
property, observing fence posts visible at that time. Jorgensen was not aware by survey 
of his exact and true boundary line but he assumed the line was below the fence and 
irrigation ditch and utilized what he believed was a road on his property below the 
irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to the properly. Such was not a 
road but was rather used to work along the irrigation ditch. A fence erected by Brown 
ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet from the road. Jorgensen's predecessors 
ran livestock. There was no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its existence 
and no evidence had been adduced that Tracy used or occupied the land on the downhill 
side of the fence. Jorgensen took surveyors and potential buyers along the ditch but such 
was not occupation of the land below the fence. Jorgensen, in anticipation of possible 
buyers, commissioned a survey in 1994, which showed the true line was not the fence 
line and Jorgensen always believed the true line was not the fence, which Jorgensen 
claimed he did not see except for a few old leaning cedar posts and testified the boundary 
line was downhill by the ditch where it was marked with a flag when Jorgensen first 
inspected the property. The survey Jorgensen commission showed Jorgensen was correct 
about the true boundary line and that it was not the fence line. 
The surveys were consistent with all the recorded instruments, which showed the 
true boundaries as depicted on Mxlubil 10 Jorgensen\s 1{){)4 survey was done by one 
France who, along with a real estate broker, talked with Brown about the results. Brown 
erected a wood rail fence along the highway to replace a wire fence and ran it across 
approximately 167 feet of Jorgensen's proper t) to tl le dispi ited fence in the late 1990s 
Vehicles could access the area by use of the road along the ditch before Brown's wooden 
rail fence was installed. Each party operated in good faith. 
The parties were constructively charged with knowledge of the true boundary line, 
concerning which there was no legal uncertainty, rhere was "practical" uncertainty on 
the part of Brown. Jorgensen had done nothing by word or deed to object to a visible 
fence. The issue became whether Jorgensen's inaction as to the fence, which was erected 
for a purpose not show n lb) 1:1 le e \ 'idence bi it b) inference was erected not to establish a 
boundary line but for some other purpose, amounted to mutual acquiescence in that fence 
as a boundary. (R. 484-487) 
1 1 le coi li 1: i i mde detailed coi lclusioi is < :)f law (R 48 7 491), conch iding essentially 
as follows: 
1. Brown had constructive knowledge of the true property line since Brown 
commissioned a survey in 197 .; deeds and documents showed the true boundary 
line as well and that it was not the fence line constrt icted by Bi c »wn's father. 
2. Jorgensen was the record title of the disputed land having had constructive 
knowledge of the true property line since at least 1994 when he commissioned a survey 
and having constructive knowledge since 1979 when he obtained a deed with a property 
description. 
3. Brown operated under the presumption the fence constructed in the 1940s by 
his father was the property line. 
4. The fence had been open and notorious and visible since the 1940s, on 
occasion being in disrepair, but had been an observable fence since then. 
5. Brown used and occupied the land as if it were his and was open and notorious 
about his use and the fence served as an observable boundary for a long period of time 
between two adjoining land owners. 
6. The topography and terrain made the fence placement a practical place to erect 
a fence as it would keep cattle and sheep off the lower irrigation ditch in the drop off and 
off what was in the 1940s pasture land until the home was built in 1971. 
7. Given the slope, the irrigation ditch and the terrain, the court inferred and 
concluded that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock and to keep grazing 
livestock of the predecessor owner of the Brown property and was not intended as a 
boundary line demarcating the property. 
8. There had been occupation of the land by Brown up to the fence. There had 
been no occupation by Jorgensen/predecessors below the fence, only to the fence. 
9. There was no mutual acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. 
10. The area is rural. 
11. Jorgensen visited only on occasion as he purchased his 195 acres for 
investment and had possible plans to subdivide the area. 
12. Jorgensen di :11 lot 1 .< ik .e a.ii> actioi I to oi ist Bi < : w i i, and remained silent relating 
to Brown until 1999. 
13. Jorgensen's commission of a survey in 1994 indicated a lack of acquiescence 
since tl le hiring of a survey conveys :ie opposite ofacquiescen.ee and if Jorgensen... had 
acquiesced in the notion the fence was the boundary he would not have commissioned a 
survey hence, that act, though not conveyed directly to the Plaintiff, showed lack of 
acquiescence, and unwillingness to accept the fence as the property line. 
1 '• The fact of obtainii lg a si irve> was conveyed to Biw v n.. throi igh Wallace 
France. But it need not have been conveyed to Brown to evidence Jorgensen's lack of 
acquiescence or unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line. 
15. Brown had to pi en • *1. t 11 iti lal acqi iiescence in tl: i..e fence as a boi indary by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
16. The court disagreed with Brown's argument that unless Jorgensen proved lack 
of acquiescence, there was acquiescence. 
17. Any action showing an unwillingness to acknowledge the fence as a boundary 
was sufficient to defeat application of the doctrine since Brown had to prove 
acquiescence on the part of both parties, which "recognized and acknowledged" a visible 
line as a boundary line. 
18. There is no good reason to determine that lack of acquiescence is only 
effective if conveyed to the opposing land owner since the doctrine requires that there be 
an actual acknowledgement and that both parties treat the fence as a common boundary. 
19. Telling others the fence is not the boundary or hiring a surveyor seemed to the 
court to defeat the idea of an acknowledgement in a boundary line. 
20. Brown was aware in 1994 there was a dispute when France talked to him 
about the property line being other than at the fence line. 
21. The seeming inaction of Jorgensen was not shown as approval of the fence as 
a boundary line. 
22. Brown's argument sought, in effect, to reduce the elements of boundary by 
acquiescence from four to three, to simple occupation of land up to a visible fence or 
boundary without more. 
23. Occupation of land up to a fence or boundary without more is not 
acquiescence, the court rejecting Brown's argument. 
24. Brown had to show that Tracy recognized and acknowledged the visible line 
and while there may be an inference Tracy, running livestock, saw the fence, that was 
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let alone acknowledged it 
as a boundary line. 
25. The four elements of the doctrine do not overlap. 
26. Failure to occupy by Tracy coupled with occupation by Brown did not 
amount to acknowledgement of the fence as a boundary. 
27. The elements of boundary by acquiescence had not been proved by Brown 
though there had been occupation by Brown up to a visible mark over a long period of 
time over twenty years and the parties were adjoining land owners. 
28. B • * • • •.•• • . . , . ' , •* * t ' - i H r i > - ( »«.* ^ t ' - l u a l • 
acquiescence by both parties in the fence as the boundary line. 
29. While Jorgensen did not oust Brown, Jorgensen did not agree the fence was 
the boi indary. 
30. Given the court's conclusion about the action of Jorgensen in 1994 amounting 
to a dispute because of a failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there had not even 
been an undisputed period of twenty years since Jorgensen took ownership. 
31. Recent court decisions were confusing bi it mean that knowledge of the act ual 
true boundary is not relevant. 
32. Although there never was legal uncertainty at to the true boundary line, there 
was actual i incei tail it) " bi it tl lat does i lot allc vv the docti Iiie of boi mdai j by acquiescence 
to grant an interest in property. 
33. The appearance of the area, the terrain, the nature of the land and its use by 
the parties did not allow a residei it t :> obtaii i lai id b) r i i lei ely coi isti ucting a fence and then 
merely because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence removed, claim 
title to the area up to the fence. 
34. Brown did not intend to appropriate the land nor was there evidence the fence 
was erected for an improper pi u pose bi it the clear inference was tl lat tl ic fence was 
erected to contain livestock and protect a ditch and not to establish a boundary line. 
35. Brown's predecessors' record deeds all showed the actual boundary lines of 
the properties. 
36. Brown did not show that Jorgensen or his predecessors mutually acquiesced 
for twenty years in the fence as a property line. 
37. The statute of frauds did not apply. 
38. Jorgensen was entitled to have his title quieted per the recorded instruments. 
(R. 481-492) 
Brown filed objections to Jorgensen's proposed order quieting title to the 6.94 
acres in Jorgensen, requesting a formal set of findings and conclusions be prepared 
separate from the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained in the court's 
memorandum decision, objecting to the proposed order incorporating the metes and 
bounds description of the 6.94 acres claimed by Brown because the court's findings did 
not reference that description, objecting to language in the proposed order concerning 
removal offences because the court's memorandum decision did not so state and 
objecting to language in the order awarding costs upon the filing of a cost memorandum. 
(R. 493-500, Addendum III hereto) 
Following the filing of Jorgensen's memorandum responding to Brown's 
objections to the proposed order (R. 501-504) the court scheduled oral argument on 
Brown's objections to take place July 12, 2004. (R. 505-507) 
On June 15, 2004, Brown filed a Post Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter 
or Amend the Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing (R. 535-537) by 
which Brown requested the com t to allow Plaintiff to amend Plainti f fs pleading "to 
conform to the evidence tried by consent on issues of prescriptive easement" arguing that 
the court should amend its findings and memorandum decision and determine Brown's 
use of Jorgenseii s pi o p a l " li.i I 'r iprncti into a p i v s r n p h \ c r a s n n n i f ' (Brown ' s 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support o f Plaintiff s Post Trial Motion to 
Amend Pleadings, Findings and Memorandum Decision, R. 526-534.) 
- - lorgensen filed a memorandum in opposition to Brown's motion, 
(R. 538-548) , and Brown filed a response to Jorgensen's opposition memorandum (R. 
549-558) . After the July 12, 2004 oral argument (R. 559) on Brown's objection to 
Jorgensen's proposed order and on Brown's motion to amend Brown's pleadings and to 
alter or amend the court's n lei iioi andum decision, oi i Ji il) • 15, 2:004, the coiii I: made a 
Ruling and Order (R. 565-568, Addendum IV hereto) directing Jorgensen to prepare a 
slightly modified judgment, including the property description as set forth in Jorgensen's 
proposed order, as the com t foi md that description was an acci n ate description of the 
property, and ordering Brown to remove the fence along the roadway and improvements 
to the hillside fence which had been installed by Brown. 
I h i t Kulnip, .iiitl < hilei denied Brown ' s motion to amend Brown's pleadings and 
to amend the court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision because the court's decision 
was made entirely on Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim and Jorgensen's quiet 
title counterclaim The court specifically found: 
1. ' I he court's decision was NO I based oi i tl ie dc eti it le • :)f prescript ive easement. 
2. The court did not view the trial as one where the parties agreed explicitly or 
implicitly to try any prescriptive easement or any other cause of action other than 
Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim. 
3. The phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial and was 
certainly not briefed nor argued. 
4. The court did not make its decision based on that doctrine. 
5. Whether the evidence supported or did not support such a claim was not the 
issue. 
6. Had Jorgensen been given a chance to address and challenge that theory, the 
court had no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal conclusions might 
have been drawn. 
7. While there was testimony on use by Brown, Jorgensen did not focus on that 
because the focus was on who had title to the land. 
8. Jorgensen had the right to know what claims he was defending against and he 
was defending against a claim of Brown that Brown had title to the property under the 
property law doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
9. The court did not understand and Jorgensen did not understand that the 
evidence was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of Brown. 
10. The evidence having been presented by Brown and by Jorgensen to convince 
the court that either Brown or Jorgensen had title to the disputed land, which the court 
decided, the court did not attempt to nor did it decide anything else. 
11. Brown might have originally alleged alternative theories of title or easement 
or Brown could have amended pleadings long ago, having filed the case in May 2001 and 
that the matter could have been tried on alternative theories. 
Iz. ii so, Jorgensen "^ "iM h?{ e facet) and challenged <vi<'h (»i either iheory. 
13. Jorgensen did not defend against a claim of easement usage by Brown. 
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 4 The court did not decide such. 
15. Jorgensei i did not i i 101 n it a defense to tl ic: i lse and coi ltinuoi is aspects of 
prescriptive easement law because Jorgensen did not know Brown was claiming that. 
16. Whether there were defenses to such facts as Brown could present is 
unknown. 
17. The court could not decide if Brown had a viable case for a prescriptive 
easement based on the facts the parties presented. 
It would be fundamentally unfair to allow Brown to seek recovery of a 
different sort < - different cai lse of actioi I seeking certain pern: lissive use rathei thai i 
title, what was asked for in Brown's pleading (R. 565-567, Addendum IV hereto). 
On August 2, 2004, judgment was entitled quieting title to Jorgensen's property in 
Jorgensen ai id dii ecting remo\ al of tl ic Bi o v(« i I fei ice/fence improvements whir ii >wn 
had placed thereon in 1995. (R. 569-573, Addendum V hereto). The judgment quieted 
title in Jorgensen free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence/other claims of Thomas 
E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all other persons who may claim 
by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, I":t ; n u 1 M ; u ilyi l R Bi < m n. or either < )f tl lei n The 
judgment directed Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. to forthwith remove the wood fence 
erected by him along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the Jorgensen property and to 
remove the hillside wire fence improvements installed by Brown. The judgment stated 
Jorgensen "should be and is hereby awarded his costs of court incurred herein as may 
hereafter be established by memorandum of costs and disbursements filed pursuant to 
Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." (R. 569-573, Addendum V hereto) 
Brown filed Brown's Notice of Appeal on August 25, 2004. (R. 574) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Jorgensen filed an Affidavit of Facts in Support of Jorgensen's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
113-120) 
2. Brown filed a Motion to Strike the Jorgensen Affidavit. (R. 235-236) 
3. By Ruling and Order filed April 6, 2002 (R. 281-284), Judge Hilder denied 
Brown's motion to strike the affidavit of Lee Jorgensen for the reasons stated in the 
memorandum Jorgensen filed in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
(R. 266-272; 281) and denied both parties respective motions for summary judgment, 
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 Jorgensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Brown's Motion to Strike (R. 266-272) 
pointed out: 
1. Brown had not specifically identified what statements of fact in Jorgensen's 
Affidavit Brown felt objectionable. 
2. The Jorgensen Affidavit specifically stated Jorgensen had personal knowledge of 
the matters set forth in the Affidavit. 
3. The Affidavit affirmed what Brown had alleged as to Jorgensen holding title to the 
6.94 acres sought by Brown. 
4. Jorgensen's personal belief and state of mind as to the location of his property line 
was obviously relevant and neither a "conclusion" nor a "supposition or 
speculation" as apparently contended by Brown. 
Jorgensen's Affidavit set forth: 
a. The facts observed by Jorgensen and his personal understanding based thereon 
as to the location of Jorgensen's northeasterly property line below the old fence, 
irrigation ditch and "Ditch Road". 
b. Jorgensen's 1978 observations of survey stakes along what became his 
northeastern property line below the irrigation ditch and set forth information 
given to Jorgensen at that time as to the property line being marked by stakes-
downhill from the Ditch Road which provided the only viable access to the 
property and was a significant reason why he purchased it. 
c. Fence remnants were on the property when Jorgensen acquired it, which did not 
show evidence of maintenance for many decades. 
d. Information Jorgensen received from the agent of a realty company was that the 
old fence remnants were within the property- information coinciding with 
survey stakes and the legal description. 
e. Jorgensen had visited the property a few times from 1978 to 1994 and in the 
course of those visits had not observed livestock northeast (downhill) from the 
old fence remnants. 
f. Jorgensen had not run livestock on his property but had given others permission 
to do so. 
g. Jorgensen's understanding was that the fence remnants were meaningless. 
h. In 1994, conversations with Brown had taken place (between Brown and others) 
concerning possible sale/development of the Jorgensen property and Jorgensen 
had personally observed that Brown thereafter rebuilt the old fence, 
i. In 1999, Jorgensen visited the property again and observed a wooden fence 
constructed by Brown obstructing the entrance to the Ditch Road and a new wire 
fence where the old fence had been, 
j . Jorgensen directed a handwritten letter to Brown dated July 30, 1999 which 
Brown had made Exhibit "F" to Brown's December 20, 2001 memorandum, (R. 
107) asking Brown to remove the fence, 
k. Brown refused to remove the fence. 
1. Jorgensen observed what appeared to have been efforts by Brown to obstruct the 
old ditch road and described where the fence had been reconstructed in relation 
to photographs taken by Jorgensen and photographs taken by Brown, 
m. Jorgensen and Brown had a discussion thereafter in which Jorgensen did not 
agree the old fence remnants were intended to be or should be regarded as 
establishing the property line, 
n. Jorgensen had never been uncertain about the location of his property line, 
o. Jorgensen's opinion was that the old fence was to provide livestock control- an 
opinion consistent with the use of net wire and barb wire in the old fence, 
p. The recent increase in the property value of the 6.94 acres and the need for 
access to the rest of Jorgensen's steep property provided by the Ditch Road 
running through the 6.94 acres. 
ruling that Brown had satisfied elements (iii) and (iv) of the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, leaving elements (i) and (ii) for the fact finder at trial 
4. The Affidavit of Lee Jorgensen (R. 113-120) was not made an exhibit at trial. 
(See Exhibit list R. 479-480) nor was it referred to in the course of Jorgensen's 
examination/cross-examination during which he testified essentially as set forth in his 
Affidavit. (Tr. 14-37; 170-208; 296-297) 
5. The statement of facts in Brown's brief consist of twenty-eight numbered 
paragraphs. These refer to Brown's title to Brown's property, Jorgensen's title to 
Jorgensen's property; the old fence, with some of Brown's interspersed conclusions; 
Brown's claimed use of Jorgensen's property; Brown's 1971 survey of Brown's property; 
some of the 1994 activity concerning Jorgensen possibly subdividing/selling part of this 
property, including Wallace France showing Brown a 1994 Jorgensen property 
subdivision lot diagram, (R. 209 is a copy) (Tr. 102-103; 257-259); Jorgensen's July 
1999 letter to Brown asking Brown to remove the fence; a subsequent 1999 survey made 
by Brown and Brown's filing action to quiet title to Jorgensen's 6.94 acres under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (Brown's Brief, pages 9-14). 
6. Neither Brown's statement of facts nor Brown's argument (Brown's brief, 
pages 16-47) attempts to marshal the evidence in support of the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law made by the trial court in its April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision (R. 
481-492) finding the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock and keep cattle and 
q. Jorgensen had paid all property taxes assessed against the property since he 
acquired it. (R. 266-272) 
sheep off the irrigation ditch and that Jorgensen/predecessor had not acknowledged the 
old fence as a property line. 
7. The trial court's finding that the old fence was erected for livestock control 
rather than to establish a property line was fully supported, indeed compelled, by the 
evidence including the following: 
a. The historical and current record deed title evidence. Brown's chain of title 
(Exhibit 5), Jorgensen's chain of title (Exhibit 18) and all the surveys, including the 
survey Brown had made in 1971 (Exhibit 6) and 2000 (Exhibit 8) show the common 
boundary line far down the hill from the old fence, and that the eastern part of the old 
fence as it comes from the northwest jogs in a more southeasterly direction 58.36 feet 
where it meets another fence. That fence runs south far into the canyon up into 
Jorgensen's property and also runs north from that point of intersection about 112 feet 
towards Brown's property to a gate, then jogs northeasterly across Jorgensen's property 
into and across a corner of Brown's property "cutting off the southeast corner of 
Brown's property by about 200 feet offence before the fence enters Marchant's property. 
(See Jorgensen's January 22, 2002 Memorandum, R. 134 and R. 153 (plat map); R. 215 
(portion of survey showing property lines/fence lines in that area.) (Brown apparently 
never conceded the corner of Brown's property southeast of that 200 feet or so part of the 
fence to adjoining land owner Marchant.4) 
Jorgensen's memorandum filed January 22, 2002 (R. 121-150) analyzes the parcel 
descriptions used in deeds of record, none of which refer to any fences, in the context of 
their dates, the county plat map and surveys showing the fence and the party's respective 
adjoining parcels (R. 153). In the canyon, the fence line jogs southerly into the canyon 
b. The evidence concerning the location of the old fence along a relatively steep 
hillside above an irrigation ditch and ditch road (Exhibit 3, contour map, and 4, 
photographs; R. 127, 154, 156-169). 
c. The (volunteered) testimony of Lloyd Marchant as to bringing "cattle down 
and along that fence into our property" (Marchant property lying south and east of 
Brown's property and east of Jorgensen's property). (Tr. 39) 
d. The fact the old fence was a cedar post net wire and barb wire fence. (Tr. 273, 
276; R. 163-166) 
e. The fence was allowed to fall into substantial disrepair. Brown's "to whom it 
may concern" letter dated March 20, 2001 stated the fence 
"was overrun with sagebrush and in great disrepair. In the summer of 1995 I 
rebuilt the north portions of the fence along the old fence line using steel posts and 
new wire.. .portions of rotted- off cedar posts are still visible along portions of the 
fence line...." (Exhibit 15 and R. 155). 
Brown's letter shows the fences original use for livestock control had become 
unnecessary in later years (even as to containing any livestock Brown testified he ran 
below the fence) as land usage changed. Brown's substantial fence repair undertaking 
took place after Brown visited with Wally France and Craig McPhee and others in 1994 
and learned of Jorgensen's possible plans to subdivide part of his property (R. 490; Tr. 
16-17; 20-28; 34-37). 
and a branch of the fence runs northerly in that canyon area, thence northeasterly. The 
jogging intersecting fences and gates in that area could only have functioned for livestock 
control/access and make no sense whatsoever in terms of the parties respective straight 
section line/quarter section line deed descriptions in that area. (R. 153; R. 128-133 and 
exhibits thereto: R. 170, 172, 174, 176, 101, 180, 184, 186, and 215) 
8. Brown submitted no evidence concerning how Tracy Land & Livestock 
Company, a Corporation, or T. Tracy Wright regarded the old fence. Tracy, Jorgensen's 
principal predecessor owner, per recorded deeds, owned what later became Jorgensen5s 
property between June 16, 1947 and April 3, 1978. (R. 170, Tracy 1947 deed; R. 174 and 
R. 176 deeds, copies of which are included in Exhibit 18). The court was unwilling to 
infer that Tracy had acquiesced for at least twenty years in the old fence as Tracy's 
property line without evidence of how Tracy actually regarded the old fence. (R. 490) 
9. The trial court's finding that there had not been a period of twenty years since 
Jorgensen's ownership during which there was no dispute as to the effect of the old fence 
was fully supported by Jorgensen's evidence that he saw stakes on the actual property 
line downhill from the fence and irrigation ditch when he visited the property in 1978 
before buying it in 1979; he entered what he assumed was his property along the Ditch 
Road below the old fence several times; he assumed the old "skiwampus" fence posts 
were meaningless and commenced action in 1994 to possibly subdivide some of his 
property, including the part below the old fence, which action was communicated to 
Brown in 1994 by means of conversations between Brown, Wally France, Craig McPhee 
and others, 1994 being the first time Jorgensen even learned there might be a problem 
with Brown about the boundary line. (R. 490; Tr. 16-17; 20-28; 34-37; 170-185) 
10. The trial court's finding Jorgensen had not acquiesced in the old fence as his 
boundary line was compelled not only by the above referenced evidence but also by 
Jorgensen's getting a survey in 1994 and another in 2000 and Jorgensen writing a letter to 
Brown in July 1999 asking Brown to remove the fence. (Tr. 34-35; 189-90; Exhibits 8 
and 13) 
11. The trial court's April 7, 2004 Post Trial Memorandum Decision and July 15, 
2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's post trial motion to amend Brown's pleading, 
amend the court's findings, vacate the court's memorandum decision and grant Brown a 
prescriptive easement, make it very clear the case was tried and decided solely and only 
on Brown's boundary by acquiescence theory, not on any prescriptive easement theory. 
(R. 481-492 and R. 565-567) Brown's brief does not attempt to show otherwise. 
12. Jorgensen filed no memorandum of costs and disbursements following entry 
of the court's August 2, 2004 judgment quieting title to Jorgensen's property in 
Jorgensen. 
13. Brown did not make any trial court objection to the inclusion in the judgment 
of language quieting title in Jorgensen against any persons who may claim under Brown. 
(R. 493-500, Brown's objection to proposed order; R. 518-519; R. 535-537 and R. 526-
533, Brown's post trial motion and memorandum) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court's ruling denying Brown's Motion to Strike Jorgensen's 
Affidavit, which was not even mentioned at trial, was not a final appealable order nor 
was the trial court's ruling denying Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Browns having failed to marshall the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings of fact and having failed to show any clear error therein, this court assumes the 
record supports the findings. 
3. The trial court's post trial Memorandum Decision itself abundantly sets forth 
the evidence presented by each party, largely undisputed, upon which the trial court made 
its very detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law and its decision. 
4. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence does not permit an adjoining 
landowner to acquire neighboring land by merely using/occupying it for over twenty 
years such as for livestock grazing up to a fence without ouster/objection from the 
property owner. 
5. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence requires satisfactory proof that both 
landowners actually intended a visible line such as the fence to be their property line and 
such an intent cannot be inferred against the record title holder from the title holder's lack 
of objection to the adjoining owner's use. 
6. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence contravenes both statute of fraud 
Section 25-5-1, U.C.A. requiring transfers of real property to be made by written 
instrument, and Section 78-12-7, U.C.A. giving the real property title holder a conclusive 
presumption another's use of the title holder's property is permissive unless the claimant 
proves compliance with the other specific adverse possession requirements of that statute. 
For that reason and because of the vague and unsatisfactory nature of the boundary of 
acquiescence, such doctrine should be abandoned in favor of determining claims to land, 
which are not based on written conveyance/grants, under the principles of law pertaining 
to written instruments and contracts and under the principles of the law of equitable 
estoppel. 
7. Brown's belated post trial motion to vacate the court's decision and grant 
Brown a prescriptive easement of some kind as to Jorgensen's property could not be 
granted under Rule 15(b) or otherwise because no prescriptive easement theory was tried, 
recognized or even mentioned before or during the trial and the court's ruling was 
directly only to Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim. 
8. Since Jorgensen filed no cost memorandum, no final judgment for costs could 
have been entered against Brown. Brown's assertion a costs judgment was entered 
against him is in error. 
9. Brown's not having objected below to the recital in the judgment that title to 
Jorgensen's property was quieted in Jorgensen against anyone claiming through Brown, 
Brown's objection presents no appealable issue. Such recital is harmless to Brown. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL, BEFORE TRIAL, OF BROWN'S 
MOTION TO STRIKE JORGENSEN'S AFFIDAVIT DOES 
NOT PRESENT AN APPEALABLE ISSUE. 
Brown's vague argument that Judge Hilder should have stricken Jorgensen's 
Affidavit (R. 113-120) filed in support of Jorgensen's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and in opposition to Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment and granted Brown's 
Motion for Summary Judgment is inexplicable. Both motions for summary judgment 
were denied. (R. 281-283) Denial of a motion for summary judgment is nol a final, 
hence appealable order. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 
1997) md Jensen v. Nielsen, 447 P.2d 906 (Utah 1968). 
Brown's brief does not purport to show, nor could it, that denial of Brown's 
Motion to Strike/Denial of Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment infected the later 
trial, before another judge, with any error of fact or law. Jorgensen's Affidavit was not 
made a trial exhibit nor was it even referred to at the trial at which Jorgensen testified as 
to the facts essentially as set forth in his affidavit with objections to part of his testimony 
being sustained. (R. 429-480; Tr. 14-37; 170-208; 296-297) 
Judge Hilder properly refused to strike Jorgensen's affidavit for the reasons set 
forth in Jorgensen's memorandum filed March 7, 2002, (R. 266-272) which are stated in 
footnote 3, pages 19-24 above. 
Brown's argument that the trial court should have stricken Jorgensen's Affidavit 
and granted Brown's Motion for Summary Judgment presents no final factual or legal 
issue for this court to decide. 
POINT II 
SINCE BROWN'S BRIEF NEITHER MARSHALS THE EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS NOR PURPORTS TO 
FERRET OUT ANY BASIS FOR DETERMINING THE SAME TO BE CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS, THIS COURT IS TO ASSUME THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE 
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
The arguments made in Brown's brief, (pages 16-47) appear to attack the trial 
court's findings of fact. However, Brown's brief neither marshals the evidence 
supporting the trial court's findings, nor does it purport to show they are clearly 
erroneous/legally insufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. Therefore, 
this court is to assume the evidence supports the findings. Awinc Corp, v. Simonsen, 112 
P.3d 1228 (Utah App. 2005) and West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
As set forth above, the eleven page single spaced Memorandum Decision made by 
Judge Lubeck after the trial discussed Utah boundary by acquiescence cases, made 
extensive detailed findings of fact, making numerous references to the details of the 
evidence presented by both parties, and stated the court's conclusions of lav/, fully 
showing just how and exactly why the court arrived at its final rulings, leaving nothing 
whatsoever to speculation. (R. 481-492) 
If anything, the overall tenor of the trial court's Memorandum Decision is strongly 
favorable to Brown as the court could well have but did not find that Brown had not 
actually "continually used" the property downhill from the fence for grazing livestock or 
even genuinely thought it was his because of Brown's 1971 survey clearly showing the 
property was not his and because Brown, by his own written statement stated the old 
fence had fallen into a state of near total disrepair (Exhibit 15 and R. 155) only 
replacing/repairing it and fencing Jorgensen out of the Ditch Road in 1995 after Brown 
learned in 1994 of Jorgensen's subdividing/sales intent. (See R. 490; Tr. 16-17; 20-28; 
34-37; Exhibit 15 and R. 155) 
The court's basic findings that: 1) the old fence was for livestock control and not 
intended as a property line boundary and; 2) that there was no evidence showing that 
either Tracy or Jorgensen acknowledged the old fence as a property line was really 
compelled by undisputed evidence that Jorgensen knew his property line was not the old 
fence and the total lack of evidence as to how Tracy regarded the fence, as specifically 
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and extensively set forth in the trial court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision (R. 
481-492). See pages 9-15 and 22-24 above. 
POINT III 
THE DOCTRINE OF BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE DOES NOT PERMIT 
THE TAKING OF REAL PROPERTY BY MEANS OF AN ADJOINING 
LANDOWNER'S USE THEREOF WITHOUT OBJECTION/OUSTER 
Brown's insistently and repeatedly argued before, during and after trial and now 
on appeal that Brown acquired Jorgensen's property below the old fence by whatever use 
of it (or part of it) Brown may have made of it without objection from Tracy or 
Jorgensen, insisting that lack of affirmative objection/ouster action on the part of 
Tracy/Jorgensen equals legal binding "acquiescence" in the old fence as the parties 
property line, thus presenting the legal issue of whether the trial court should have so 
ruled. 
Brown's argument assumes that recorded deeds and surveys, all showing the 
property lines to be far away from the old fence are totally irrelevant; that the 
landowner's personal understanding of the location of his property line, consistent with 
the deeds, is totally irrelevant; that landowner's lack of actual personal awareness of use 
made of his property and of how and unknown to the landowner claimant considers the 
fence irrelevant and that whether a prior landowner considered an old fence to be a 
livestock fence or a boundary line fence or even knew about its existence is also totally 
irrelevant. 
Utah's judicial doctrine of boundary by acquiescence has changed and been 
confusingly inconsistent. A clarifying decision said the doctrine does not apply where 
the recorded ownership deeds show the property line, hence "objective uncertainty" as to 
the property line does not exist. Halladay v. Cluff 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). Then a 
reversing decision was made to the effect that "objective uncertainty" does not need to be 
shown for application of the doctrine. Stoker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
Nonetheless, the cases do make clear that the "mutual acquiescence" element of 
the doctrine requires evidence that both parties acknowledge a line; that bolh 
acknowledge it by affirmative acts/words as the demarcation of their properties and that 
any conversation/action on the part of the landowner showing the landowner does not 
consider a line as his property line defeats application of the doctrine. Wilkinson Family 
Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999) and Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 
(Utah 2002). 
In Wilkinson Family Farm, Wilkinson claimed ownership of five acres of 
Babcock's rural property lying on Wilkinson's side of a fence on the ground on the basis 
of Wilkinson's use of the parcel for over twenty years for crops and grazing. As Brown 
does here, Wilkinson argued "indolence" on the part of Babcock permitted Wilkinson's 
long continued use to establish a boundary line acquiescence presumption against 
Wilkinson in favor of Babcock. The trial court had quieted Babcock's record title in 
Babcock because there had not been mutual acquiescence by both parties in the fence as 
the demarcation of their properties. This court specifically disagreed with Wilkinson's 
"indolence" argument, holding that "mere acquisition and use, without more, is 
insufficient to establish boundary by acquiescence'' 993 P.2d 229, 232 (emphasis added) 
and affirmed the trial court's decision, stating the actual purpose of the fence was 
1 1 
relevant, noting that fences for livestock control, placement of irrigation ditches and other 
purposes had been held in other cases not to constitute property ownership boundaries 
because of lack of actual mutual intent that the fence be the ownership boundary. 
Wilkinson cited Nunley v. Walker, 369 P.2d 117 (Utah 1972) with approval, a pre-Staker 
v. Ainsworth case, which said that if there was no uncertainty as to the actual boundary 
line, the parties may not, knowing where the true boundary is, establish a boundary by 
acquiescence elsewhere. This court said that Wilkinson's knowledge of the actual 
location of his property line was relevant since factual knowledge or available knowledge 
makes the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence unavailable. 
In Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002), language from which seems to have 
been used in Judge Lubeck's Memorandum Decision, the Supreme Court clearly said that 
if the claimant's evidence does not "satisfy any one of the four elements of the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence, the boundary is defeated." Ault quoted from Hales v. 
Franks, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979): "Where there is no proof of acquiescence in the line 
as the boundary, there can be no boundary by acquiescence" and "[T]he plaintiffs 
occupation to the fence without interference was not sufficient to establish defendant's 
acquiescence in the fence as a boundary." Ault plainly states that".. .the party must show 
that both parties recognized and acknowledged a visible line, such as a fence or building, 
as the boundary of the adjacent parcels"; that "record property owners are not required to 
take legal action or otherwise "oust" someone adversely occupying their property to 
maintain their legal rights in their property" and that: 
'They must only take some action manifesting that they do not acquiesce or 
recognize the particular line, e.g. a fence, as a boundary between the properties. 
Indeed, mere conversations between the parties evidencing either an ongoing 
dispute as to the property line or an unwillingness by one of the adjoining 
landowners to accept the land as the boundary refute any allegation that the parties 
have mutually acquiesced in the line as the property demarcation... .Specifically, 
conversations in which a record owner unequivocally informs the other that he 
owns beyond the "visible line" claimed as a boundary, and that the owner does not 
recognize that line as separating the properties, are conclusive that a party has not 
acquiesced in the line as the property line." Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 
2002) 
Ault thus made it clear that if A allows B to use A's property without 
objection/ouster action, even for twenty years or more, such alone does not legally justify 
B in then taking legal ownership of A's property, over A's objection (sans deed, 
compliance with the statute of frauds or payment of taxes.) Ault plainly means that 
property owners are not legally obligated to find or eject trespassers, even continuing 
trespassers, to prevent them from taking the landowner's property. 
Judge Lubeck obviously correctly applied the principles enunciated and referred 
to in Wilkinson and Ault to the facts of this case. 
To reduce the mutual acquiescence in the line as a property ownership boundary 
line factual proof element to merely proof of unilateral trespassing use without 
objection/ouster on the part of the record title holder plus a trespasser's self-serving 
assertions of personal belief of ownership, directly contrary to the written recorded deeds, 
as here urged by Brown, would clearly impose a totally outrageous burden on 
5
 The reasoning and result reached in Ault really recognizes and enforces, without 
expressly recognizing so, the statutory presumption that Section 78-27-7, U.C.A. (1953) 
places on a trespassers use of property. The statute makes it clear that such has no effect 
on title unless the trespasser has taken the additional action to acquire the property 
(without a deed) specified by that statute. 
landowners, especially relatively new owners of vacant rural land held for investment in 
the context of ever changing land ownership and changing land uses. Deeds could no 
longer be relied upon to prove ownership. Owners would have to repeatedly visit their 
property to ascertain whether trespass was occurring (perhaps intermittently such as for 
summertime grazing), whether or not any trespassing was damaging in anyway, then to 
identify and chase off the trespasser, especially if the trespasser could be identified as an 
owner of adjacent land, and/or to write letters and make records protesting trespasser's 
use or of the granting them permissive use. And what if a litigant should convince the 
court to judicially reduce the twenty year element to ten years? Five years? To impose 
Brown's view of the law on landowners would subject subsequent landowners to the risk 
of loss of perhaps even a substantial portion of paid for valuable ground6 to a trespasser 
by reason of twenty + years ago unknowable historical actions/inactions of long deceased 
predecessor title holders- in this case corporate owner, Tracy Land & Livestock 
Company. 
Jorgensen was an absentee landowner. (See Tr. 14) Jorgensen purchased for 
investment. (Tr. 18 and 34) Jorgensen seldom visited his property and only became 
aware in 1994 that it was Brown who owned adjoining property. (Tr. 16-17) Jorgensen 
never even spoke to Brown until 1999. (Tr. 24; 186-188) Brown never did personally see 
any grazing or other use of his property by Brown. (R. 116) Jorgensen did not become 
The 6.94 acres of Jorgensen's property sought by Brown included a strip of flat land 
and the road along the irrigation ditch which provided access to the rest of the 195 acres 
without which access Jorgensen testified he would never have purchased the property. 
There was no other good access to the 195 acres of mountain property. (Tr. 195-196) 
aware of Brown's new fencing and culverts until 1994. (Tr. 35) Jorgensen did not live on 
or use his 195 acres, only occasionally visiting it so he was in no position to know the 
nature or extent of Brown's current or historical trespassing use of Jorgensen's property. 
Nor could Jorgensen have any knowledge about any thirty-forty-fifty year ago 
conversations/deals, or lack of such, between predecessor adjoining property owners 
respecting fences/irrigation ditch or anything else. 
The change in the law urged by Brown would also constitute a wholly 
unwarranted judicial repeal/amendment of the presumption set forth in Section 78-12-7, 
U.C.A. (1953) which provides: 
In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the 
person establishing a legal title to the property shall be presumed to have been 
possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the 
property by any other person shall be deemed to have been under and in 
subordination to the legal title, unless it appears that the property has been held 
and possessed adversely to such legal title for seven years before the 
commencement of the action, (emphasis added)7 
Adoption of Brown's position would also constitute wholly unwarranted judicial 
repeal/amendment of Section 25-5-1 U.C.A. (1953) of Utah's statute of frauds which 
expressly precludes creation/acquisition of interests in real property other thatn leases for 
a term not exceeding one year except by written deed/conveyance subscribed by the party 
creating/granting the interest. 
7
 Jorgensen asked the trial court to afford him the conclusive statutory presumption of the 
legal effect of any use/occupancy of Jorgensen's property by Brown provided by Section 
78-12-7 U.C.A. (R. 329) but the trial court ruled (erroneously Jorgensen contends) that 
Section 78-12-7 only applies to adverse possession actions (R. 429) 
8
 Jorgensen asked the trial court to rule that the existence of Section 25-5-1 U.C.A. 
(1953) of Utah's statute of frauds required Brown to prove that the location of the true 
Jorgensen submits that the inherently vague judicial doctrine of boundary by 
"acquiescence" is fundamentally flawed in its inexplicable total disregard of the policy, 
purpose and language of both Section 78-12-7 and Section 25-5-1 U.C.A. and by its 
unfortunate use of the vague words "occupancy" and "acquiescence." Unfortunately, the 
doctrine encourages judicial hosting of the kind of expensive, and which should be totally 
unnecessary, litigation of the kind demonstrated by this case. 
Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC v. Babcock, 993 P.2d 229 (Utah App. 1999) 
recognized the doctrine was founded in early cases in which landowners were actually 
uncertain as to their property lines so established a visible physical boundary in 
settlement of the issue. Jorgensen submits that any (now practically unnecessary due to 
modern survey methods) need to make adjoining landowners who really could not 
otherwise find their common boundary line abide by any defacto agreement establishing 
it and any need to prevent a landowner from knowingly encouraging/watching while a 
mislead neighbor puts expensive improvements on the landowner's property, which the 
landowner later decides to appropriate, can and should be dealt with by application of the 
principles embedded in contract/equitable estoppel law. There is no need whatsoever for 
continuing the vague judicial doctrine of boundary by "acquiescence", ignoring in the 
process Section 78-12-7 and 25-5-1, U.C.A., the fact land uses and land ownerships are 
property lines was unknown, uncertain or indefinite and that such led the parties 
respective previous co-terminus owners to agree upon and fix their common boundary 
line without a conveyance because such an agreement would not be a conveyance 
required to be in writing by Utah's statute of frauds (R. 328). However, the trial court 
ruled (erroneously Jorgensen contends) that the Utah statute of frauds is inapplicable to a 
boundary by acquiescence claim. (R. 428-429) 
rapidly changing and the fact it is wholly unjust and inequitable to be saddling a new 
landowner with the risk of what an adjoining landowner/his friends may claim were old 
actions/inactions of a deceased/defunct previous title holder.9 
Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim to almost seven acres of Jorgensen's 
land should have been disposed of without trial by the court's granting Jorgensen's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis of the long established consistent property 
lines shown by the deeds of record and surveys.10 
POINT IV 
BROWN'S POST TRIAL MOTION SEEKING REVERSAL OF THE COURT'S 
RULING QUIETING TITLE IN JORGENSEN AND SEEKING A PRIVATE 
EASEMENT OF SOME KIND IN JORGENSEN'S PROPERTY WAS PROPERLY 
DENIED SINCE BROWN'S PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT THEORY WAS 
NEITHER TRIED BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONSENT OF THE PARTIES 
NOR EVEN MENTIONED BY BROWN BEFORE OR DURING THE TRIAL. 
Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P. permits amendments to the pleadings to be made to conform 
to the evidence and rulings made by the trial court only when "issues not raised by the 
pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties..." (emphasis added). 
In this case, neither Brown nor Jorgensen or anyone else could know, what, if any, 
conversations/dealings Brown's father/other Brown family members may have had with 
Tracy Wright or any of his livestock foreman/employees. Did Brown's father complain 
about Tracy's livestock coming down into his irrigation ditch/farm? Did Tracy then tell 
Brown to fence them out? Did Tracy make a deal with Brown to lamb out Tracy's sheep 
on the flat land and need a net wire fence to keep them there? Hire Brown to put up the 
fence? Did Brown's father put up the fence to keep herds of cattle being put into and 
pulled off the summer range/the canyon for overrunning Brown's property? 
1
 Brown erected no improvements of any kind on Jorgensen's property, only having 
rebuilt the side hill fence and having constructed a wood fence cutting off Jorgensen's 
access along the irrigation ditch in 1995 after he learned in 1994 of plans Jorgensen then 
had to subdivide Jorgensen's property, including the portion thereof downhill from the 
old hillside fence. 
As the trial court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's post trial 
motion (R. 565-573) makes abundantly clear, at no time prior to the trial in the 
correspondence that passed between the parties, or in the pleadings, in the motions and 
arguments pertaining thereto and at no time during the trial, or in opening arguments or 
closing arguments was there any mention of Brown claiming any rights under the 
doctrine of prescriptive easement. 
Brown's post trial motion was not made in order to make Brown's pleadings 
conform with the rulings made in the court's Memorandum Decision but for the purpose 
of overturning the court's Memorandum Decision entirely upon a theory neither plead, 
raised nor tried, as clearly shown by the entire record. 
Brown's assertions that the parties presented evidence at trial relevant to elements 
of prescriptive easement and that Brown's evidence established a prescriptive easement is 
contrary to and finds no support in the record. 
Browns' brief is bereft of any citation to any evidence in the record that Jorgensen 
or Jorgensen's counsel expressly or impliedly consented to have the court consider a 
prescriptive easement claim. 
The trial record abundantly shows the case was plead, tried and determined solely 
on Brown's boundary by acquiescence claim.11 
If a prescriptive easement claim had been recognized at trial, there would have been 
much in the trial record so showing since such a theory is directly opposed to Brown's 
claim of fee simple title as it would have admitted Jorgensen's ownership and would have 
required Brown to prove use hostile to Jorgensen and that such hostile use was known by 
Jorgensen for an uninterrupted period of at least twenty years. The elements of 
Browns' Rule 15(b) argument ignores the basic purpose of Rule 15(b) U.R.C.P., 
and similar rules in other jurisdictions, which is to permit pleadings to be amended post 
trial "only when the effect will be to acknowledge that certain issues upon which the 
lower court's decision has been based or issues consistent with the trial court's judgment 
have been litigated." 6A Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1494 (p. 
11, pocket part), (emphasis added) 
The court's Memorandum Decision was certainly not based upon prescriptive 
easement factual or legal issues. Prescriptive easement issues were not tried with 
Brown's consent and Brown may well have avoided proceeding on that theory since to do 
so would have involved Brown in testifying both that he thought he owned the property 
and that he knew he did not own it but instead was using it in a manner hostile to 
Jorgensen's title with Jorgensen's knowledge. 
Express or implied consent to the trial of theories/issues not raised in the pleadings 
must be plainly evident from the trial record itself. Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 
(Utah 1998). In that case the court upheld the trial court's denial of plaintiff s motion to 
amend stating that defendant "did not expressly or impliedly consent to try the contract 
issue by merely mentioning the contract in his reply memorandum." Archuleta 
emphasized the point that evidence claimed to be relevant to the proposed amendment 
must be introduced in such manner that it is clear that both parties understood the 
prescriptive easement and the elements of boundary by acquiescence are necessarily 
mutually exclusive. 
evidence was aimed at the unplead issue, citing Coleman v. Coleman, 743 P.2d 782 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
The purpose of Rule 15(b) permitting amendments to conform to the proof is to 
align the pleadings to conform to the issues actually tried and determined and not to 
permit the raising of issues only inferentially suggested by incidental evidence in the 
record. Cole v. Layrite Products Company, 439 F.2d 958 (9th Cir. 1971). 
Brown asserts he presented evidence supporting his prescriptive easement theory. 
When evidence is introduced to support basic issues already pleaded and raised, in 
this case boundary by acquiescence, the opposing party may not be conscious of its 
possible relevance to claims/issues which have not been raised by the pleadings. 
Therefore, the relevance of such evidence to unplead claims/issues must be made clear 
at trial. 6A Wright-Miller-Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1493 (p. 19-35). 
Post trial amendment is not permitted when such would change the liability sought 
to be enforced against the defendant Wells v. Wells, 272 P.2d 167 (Utah 1954) and 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Clegg, 135 P.2d 919, cited in Wells. Brown's 
proposed amendment impermissibly sought such. 
This case had been pending for over three years and fully tried. That fact alone 
together with the fact that Jorgensen would have suffered unavoidable prejudice by the 
requested amendment required denial of Brown's motion. Kelly v. Utah Power & Light, 
746 P.2d 1189 (Utah App. 1987). 
Post trial Rule 15(b) motions cannot be granted when the amendment would cause 
prejudice to the opposing party, where sought in bad faith, where such would be futile or 
would create undue delay.l2 Madeja v. Olympic Packers, LLC, 310 F.3d 628 (9th Cir. 
2002). 
The pleading amendment cases cited in Brown's brief do not support Brown's 
position.13 
12
 The rules, including those pertaining to post judgment motions, create no entitlement to 
relief based on issues not squarely presented and squarely litigated at trial. A judgment 
may be based on an unplead issue only when consent to trial of the issue is evident from 
the record itself. No judgment may be based on issues not presented in the pleadings and 
not tried with the express or actual implied consent of the parties as shown by the record. 
An implied consent under Rule 15(b) will not be found if defendant v/ill be prejudiced. 
Prejudice exists when the defendant had no notice of the new issue, where the defendant 
could have offered additional evidence in defense or if the defendant in some other way 
was denied a fair opportunity to defend. Cioffe v. Morris, 676 F.2d 539, 541-542 (11th 
Cir. 1982). It must affirmatively appear both parties clearly understood evidence was 
offered for the purpose of aiming it at the unplead issue. MBIMotor Company, Inc. v. 
Lotus/East, Inc., 506 F.2d 709 (6th Cir. 1974) Many cases are to the same effect. See 
Monodv. Futura, Inc. 415 F.2d 1170 (10th 1969); and American Nat. Bank v. Federal 
Dep. Ins. Corp. 710 F.2d 1528 (11th Cir. 1983). American held that even had counsel 
clearly articulated an unplead issue in closing arguments, still the opposing party had not 
consented to the litigation thereof as it was never afforded an opportunity to present 
evidence on that issue. In Interstate Petroleum Corp. v. Morgan, 249 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 
2001) the Court held that the pleadings, motions and orders of the trial court establish the 
parameters of a case and the issues which were "tried' and that it is only the issues which 
were actually tried that can be treated as if raised in the pleadings via Rule 15(b). The 
actual record is depositive. Here it is abundantly clear that the only issue tried was 
whether the old fence constituted a boundary by acquiescence. 
13
 In Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 91A P.2d 288 (Utah 1999) an objection 
had been raised at trial that the court should not consider an illegality defense not alleged 
and there had been no motion to amend. The court held that the trial court abused its 
discretion when it entered a directed verdict holding a contract was illegal when that issue 
had not been plead and without considering whether amendment of the pleadings to 
conform to the evidence was even permissible and that it was necessary for the trial court 
to first determine whether the parties had in fact tried the illegality issue by express or 
implied consent. In England v. Horbach, 944 P.2d 340 (Utah 1977), the court said that a 
trial court has only limited discretion to grant an amendment of pleadings to conform to 
evidence adduced at trial and must first find a) that presentation of the merits of the action 
will be subserved by amendment and b) that admission of the evidence would not 
prejudice the adverse party in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. 
The trial court very properly applied the law denying Brown's Motion to Amend 
Pleadings, Vacate the Court's Memorandum Decision and for Prescriptive Easement as 
abundantly and specifically set forth in the trial court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order 
(R. 565-568, Addendum IV hereto) discussed on pages 16-18 and 27 above. 
POINT V 
JORGENSEN HAVING FILED NO COST MEMORANDUM, THERE IS NO 
APPEALABLE FINAL JUDGMENT FOR COSTS AGAINST BROWN. 
Brown makes a curious, totally pointless lack of cost memorandum argument- a 
lack that obviously benefited Brown, asserting "The award of costs granted to 
Jorgensen.. .should.. .be deemed invalid." 
No award of costs could have been entered by the clerk against Brown as the 
predicate cost memorandum was never filed and costs are allowable only in the amounts 
and in the manner provided by law. Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980). 
How can Brown complain of their being no actual entry of a cost judgment in any 
amount against Brown? 
There is no appellate court jurisdiction over an order not constituting a final 
judgment. R.H.D. v. S.F., 969 P.2d 947 (Utah App. 1998) 
In Fishbaugh v. Utah Power & Light, 969 P.2d 403 (Utah 1998) the court affirmed the 
trial court's denial of Fishbaugh's Rule 15(a) motion to amend filed forty-four days 
before the scheduled trial date, which had already been twice continued, the trial judge 
having stated he did not intend to continue it again. Fishbaugh had known he might have 
a claim against the city for defective signing, but had failed to state the claim in his 
amended complaint. The trial court had found Salt Lake City would not have an 
opportunity to defend against the claim before trial. 
POINT VI 
NO APPEALABLE ISSUE IS PRESENTED BY THE TOTALLY HARMLESS TO 
BROWN STATEMENT IN THE JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN 
JORGENSEN FREE AND CLEAR OF THE CLAIMS OF BROWN AND OF ALL 
PERSONS WHO MAY CLAIM UNDER BROWN SINCE BROWN DID NOT 
COMPLAIN OF THAT TO THE TRIAL COURT. 
Neither Brown's written objections to the proposed judgment (R. 493-500) nor 
Brown's June 15, 2004 Post Trial Motion (R. 535-537) nor Brown's July 12, 2004 oral 
argument included any objection to any language in the judgment quieting title against 
Brown and anyone claiming under Brown, hence any such issue was not preserved for 
appeal. Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073 (Utah App. 1996) and Coleman v. Stevens, 17 
P.3d 1122 (Utah 2000). 
The recital in the judgment quieting title against all claims and persons who may 
claim under Brown might be argued to be redundant since Brown obviously could not 
pass on anything he did not own, and apparently has not purported to do so. 
Nevertheless, such recital is harmless and inconsequential to Brown. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should affirm the August 2, 2004 Judgment Quieting Title 1o Real 
Property in Lee Jorgensen and Directing Removal of Fences/Fence Improvements. 
The court should affirm the July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order denying Brown's June 
15, 2004 Post Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence; Motion to 
Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the Court's Memorandum 
Decision. 
The court should, in the interest of rectifying changing decisional confusion 
respecting the vague doctrine of boundary by acquiescence: 
1. Recognize the unreasonable burden placed on landowners, particularly new 
landowners, by the vague, changing, wholly judicial doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence, and rule that such doctrine contradicts and runs counter to both statute of 
frauds Section 25-5-1 U.C.A., requiring transfers of real property to be written, and the 
presumption of permissive use in favor of record title holders explicitly set forth in 
Section 78-12-7 U.C.A. 
2. Rule that because application of the judicial doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence violates those statutes, such doctrine no longer exists in Utah and that the 
more clearly defined statutory and common law principles of law which apply to deeds 
and written contracts and principles of equitable estoppel law are sufficient to more 
properly address claims to land of the kind which are being asserted under the doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of September, 2005. 
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ADDENDUM I 
September 22, 2003 Ruling and Order (R. 424-430) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and 
MARILYN R. BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10, 
and other persons unknown claiming 
title or interest in the subject 
property of this action, 
Defendant. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 010600152 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: September 22, 2003 
The above matter is before the court for decision on Lee 
Jorgensen's (Defendant) motion in limine and for determination of 
legal relevance of deeds and maps and other evidence of deed 
lines and for other relief (motion in limine). 
BACKGROUND 
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary 
line. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) 
sole claim is that they have acquired the property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. Approximately 53 years 
ago, Thomas E. Brown, Jr/s father erected a fence on Defendant's 
predecessor's property, in effect appropriating 6.94 acres of 
that property. On May 30, 2001, Plaintiffs filed this law suit 
to quiet title in the property. 
On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert K. Hilder, granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs on the third and 
fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence standard. 
Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of law the 
boundary was established for a long period of time, namely 53 
years, and that the boundary was established by adjoining 
landowners, namely Plaintiffs' predecessors. In the court's June 
28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the remaining issues 
for trial are the first two prongs of the boundary by 
acquiescence standard, which are (I) occupation up to a visible 
line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (n) mutual 
acquiescence m the line as a boundary. 
On May 28, 2003, Defendant filed the present motion in 
limine. 
On July 28, 2003, Plaintiffs filed their opposition to 
Defendant's motion in limine. 
On September 12, 2003, Defendant filed his repLy to 
Plaintiffs' opposition and notice to submit for decision. No 
oral argument was requested by either party. 
DISCUSSION 
Defendant requests the court (1) declare the burden of proof 
to show boundary by acquiescence is on Plaintiffs, (2) conclude 
that Plaintiffs' testimony regarding his father's state of mind 
is irrelevant and/or inadmissible hearsay, (3) conclude that 
Plaintiffs' admission of Defendant's title and the written 
evidence of the party's respective titles to their adjoining 
property is relevant and admissible, (4) Plaintiffs' claLm is 
barred by the statute of frauds, (5) conclude that Plaintiffs 
have insufficient evidence to overcome the Utah Code Ann § 78-
12-7 presumption that Defendant has legal possession of the 
property and (6) grant partial summary judgment quieting title to 
Defendant's 6.94 acre parcel in Defendant. 
Defendant's motion raises several issues for the court to 
consider and decide, specifically, (1) which party bears the 
burden of proof to show boundary by acquiescence, (2) whether 
Plaintiffs' testimony regarding his father's state of mind is 
irrelevant and/or inadmissible hearsay, (3) whether Defendant's 
recorded title is dispositive or Plaintiffs' claim, (4) whether 
the statute of frauds applies to a boundary by acquiescerce 
claim, (5) whether § 78-12-7 provides conclusive presumption that 
Defendant possessed his property and Plaintiffs use was 
subordinate to his and (6) whether quiet title may be decided in 
this motion in limine. 
I 
Burden of Proof 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs bear the burden of proving 
his case of boundary by acquiescence by clear and convincing 
evidence. Citing 12 Am. Jur. 2d Boundaries 104. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the burden of proof for 
a boundary by acquiescence case is preponderance of the evidence. 
Moreover, in determining which party bears the burden of proof in 
a boundary by acquiescence action, the Utah Supreme Court held 
2 
that the burden of proof could be placed upon either party 
depending on the specific facts of each case. Citing Halladay v. 
Cluff, 685 P.2d 500, 507 (Utah 1984) (overruled on different 
grounds by Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990)). 
Once a prima facie case is made for the party asserting 
title ownership of the property, in order to establish a boundary 
by acquiescence other than the boundary as thus shown, the burden 
of proof is with that party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 
Nelson v. Da Rouch, 50 P.2d 273 (Utah 1935).1 "The doctrine of 
boundary by acquiescence has always been very restrictively 
applied. Since it operates to take from the fee owner a small 
strip of his land, it has never been given broad application." 
Halladay v. Cluff, supra, 685 P.2d at 508 {dissenting Justice 
Howe). 
Here, the parties concede that record title reflects 
Defendant as the owner of the disputed property. Based on public 
policy of record title and the restrictive application of 
boundary by acquiescence, the court is not inclined to leave the 
burden of proof with Defendant. Defendant has met his initial 
burden. The burden has shifted to Plaintiffs, who now bear the 
burden of showing boundary by acquiescence. Not only is this 
consonant with the policy of record title and boundary by 
acquiescence, the strip of land here is greater that a small 
strip and indeed can hardly be considered a "strip." The court, 
therefore, is persuaded to leave the burden of proof with 
Plaintiffs as the party claiming boundary by acquiescence. 
Because this is a civil case and Defendant has failed to provide 
Utah support for his contention that a clear and convincing 
standard applies, the court concludes that the burden of proof is 
by the preponderance of the evidence. 
II 
State of Mind Evidence 
Defendant claims that Thomas E. Brown, Jr.'s (Brown) 
testimony regarding his father's intent in erecting the fence is 
1
 In Ault v. Holdenr 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002), the court 
stated that "If the party attempting to establish boundary by 
acquiescence fails to satisfy any one of the elements of the 
doctrine, the boundary is defeated." This language indicates 
that the full burden is on the party claiming boundary by 
acquiescence. Even if this is the applicable standard and there 
is no initial burden on Defendant, the burden is still with 
Plaintiffs. 
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irrelevant and/or hearsay and therefore should not be admissible. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that Brown's testimony is 
admissible because he has personal knowledge of the matter. 
Specifically, Brown assisted his father in building the fence and 
had the opportunity and capacity to perceive the events and 
circumstances surrounding the construction of the fence. 
Moreover, Brown's testimony is admissible pursuant to the ancient 
boundary exception to the hearsay rule. Specifically, Utah R. 
Evid. 803(20) is based upon the longstanding doctrine that allows 
the admission of hearsay evidence to prove the location of an 
ancient corner or boundary line. Statements of Brown's father 
were made many years before the controversy arose and the fence 
has a community reputation as the boundary between the 
properties, therefore, the hearsay exception is met. 
For the court to decide what Brown may testify to here would 
be premature, as is most often the case concerning motions in 
limine. The court will be in a better situation to do so at 
trial. There is an insufficient basis to disallow Brown's 
testimony altogether and there are insufficient facts to show 
exactly what statements Defendant seeks to have excluded. The 
court concludes that during trial the court will consider the 
parties objections to specific statements during Brown's 
testimony and decide those objections at that time. 
Ill 
Record Title 
Defendant argues that his recorded deed should be admissible 
and establishes Defendant's title to the property. Furthermore, 
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' boundary by acquiescence 
evidence is legally insufficient as a matter of law as argued in 
Defendant's previous briefs. 
Plaintiffs admit that Defendant's recorded deed reflects 
that he owns the property. Nevertheless, they argue that 
Defendant's recorded deed is irrelevant to their boundary by 
acquiescence claim because they do not need to show Defendant's 
title to prove boundary by acquiescence. Moreover, Defendant's 
legal insufficiency claim was decided previously by Judge Hilder. 
Utah R. Evid. R. 401 provides that relevant evidence is 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
The court concludes that Defendant's recorded deed is 
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relevant. Plaintiffs would not need to prove a boundary by 
acquiescence claim if Defendant's deed did not show that the 
property was his. Clearly, the deed has a tendency to make the 
existence of Defendant's ownership more probable than his 
ownership would be without the deed. Moreover, as Plaintiffs 
state: "notwithstanding record title, an owner is estopped from 
claiming title because such owner acquiesced in the fence as the 
boundary line for a long period of time." The "notwithstanding 
record title" language indicates that to have a boundary by 
acquiescence claim there must be a record title holder that the 
boundary claimant is opposing. 
The court, however, agrees with Plaintiffs regarding 
Defendant's legal sufficiency claim. The third and fourth prongs 
of boundary by acquiescence have been decided in Plaintiffs favor 
as a matter of law. The first and second prongs of the test 
remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs' evidence in support of 
those prongs will be decided at trial. 
IV 
Statute of Frauds 
Defendant next claims that Plaintiffs' boundary by 
acquiescence claim is barred by the statute of frauds, Utah Code 
Ann. § 25-5-1. Specifically, Defendant argues that the statute 
of frauds precludes creation/acquisition of interests in real 
property other than leases for a term not exceeding one year 
except by written deed/conveyance subscribed by the party 
creating/granting the interest. Here, there is no writing and 
Plaintiffs fail to prove that the location of the true line was 
unknown, uncertain or in dispute. Therefore, the Defendant 
argues that Plaintiffs' boundary by acquiescence claim cannot 
prevail. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of frauds 
is irrelevant and inapplicable in a boundary by acquiescence 
action. In support, Plaintiffs argue that the Utah appellate 
courts have affirmed several cases based on boundary by 
acquiescence without written instruments, therefore, the doctrine 
clearly supercedes the statutes of frauds. Citing Orton v. 
Carter, 970 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1998)(affirming trial court decision 
finding that the elements of boundary by acquiescence were 
established and there was no written instrument.); see also 
Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990)(same); Mason v. 
Loveless, 24 P.3d 997 (Utah App. 2001) (same) . 
The court agrees with Plaintiffs. Although those cases do 
not specifically address the statute of frauds, this court is 
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controlled by previous cases. Those cases show that boundary by 
acquiescence claims have succeeded without meeting the 
requirements of the statute of frauds. The court concludes, 
therefore, that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary 
by acquiescence claims. 
V 
UCA § 78-12-7 
Defendant claims that § 78-12-7 provides a conclusive 
presumption that Defendant possessed his property and that any 
use thereof by Plaintiffs was under and in subordination to 
Defendant's legal title. Specifically, Defendant argues that all 
the elements of adverse possession must be shown to rebut the 
presumption of possession raised in the record title holder by 
§ 78-12-7. Defendant argues, therefore, that it is presumed that 
Defendant possessed his property and Plaintiffs used it with 
Defendant's permission. 
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of adverse 
possession is inapplicable in a boundary by acquiescence case. 
This court agrees with Plaintiffs. 
Section 78-12-7 relates to adverse possession. The 
Plaintiffs have not raised adverse possession as a claim. The 
sole claim is boundary by acquiescence. The court refuses to 
apply any presumption that applies to adverse possession to 
boundary by acquiescence. Boundary by acquiescence is a 
different and distinct doctrine from adverse possession. 
VI 
Quiet Title by Motion in Limine 
Defendant requests the court declare quiet title in 
Defendant. This is an improper procedural device to declare 
quiet title. Moreover, the court, Judge Robert K. Hilder, 
already decided that there are genuine issues of material fact 
with regard to the first and second prongs of boundary by 
acquiescence. Therefore, the court may not quiet title in 
Defendant without a trial. 
This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other 
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order is required 
DATED this (_^_ day of 5&cf- , 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
U 
/ 
uBRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG 
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ADDENDUM II 
April 7,2004 Memorandum Decision (R. 481-491) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. and 
MARILYN R. BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10, 
and other persons unknown claiming 
title or interest in the subject 
property of this action, 
Defendant. 
The above matter came before the court for a bench trial on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. Plaintiffs were present with James C. 
Jenkins and Defendant was present with Ray G. Martineau and David 
S. Cook. 
BACKGROUND 
The underlying law suit relates to a dispute over a boundary 
line. On May 30, 2001, plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and 
Marilyn R. Brown (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint seeking an order 
that they are the fee simple owners of certain land. They claim 
to be the sole owners because they have acquired the property 
under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The issue is 
straight-forward. Defendant owns the disputed land by deed and 
all recorded instruments. Approximately 53 years ago, Thomas E. 
Brown, Jr.'s father erected a fence on Defendant's predecessor's 
property and plaintiff and his predecessors have been using the 
property since then under the belief that the fence was in fact 
the recorded property line. It was not, and so the issue is 
whether that use now amounts to acquiring the property under the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
On June 14, 2001, defendant answered and filed a 
counterclaim seeking to quiet title in the property. Defendant 
claims to be the record owner of the disputed property. 
The parties filed motions for summary judgment and partial 
summary judgment. On April 6, 2002, the court, Judge Robert K. 
Hilder, granted partial summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs 
Case No. 010600152 
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DATE: Aoril 7, 2004 
on the third and fourth prongs of the boundary by acquiescence 
standard. Specifically, the court concluded that as a matter of 
law the boundary was established for a long period of time, 
namely 53 years, and that there were adjoining properties. In the 
court's June 28, 2002 clarification the court stated that the 
remaining issues for trial are the first two prongs of the 
boundary by acquiescence standard, which are (i) occupation up to 
a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (ii) 
mutual acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
Defendant filed motions in limine in May, 2003, and the 
court issued its ruling on- September 22, 2003. The court ruled 
that the burden is on Plaintiffs, who now bear the burden of 
showing boundary by acquiescence and that the burden of proof is 
by the preponderance of the evidence. The court also ruled it 
was premature for the court to decide what Brown may testify to 
concerning specific statements. The court concluded that 
Defendant's recorded deed is relevant as Plaintiffs would not 
need to prove a boundary by acquiescence claim if Defendant's 
deed did not show that the property was his but the first and 
second prongs of the test remain and sufficiency of Plaintiffs' 
evidence in support of those prongs will be decided at trial. 
The court also determined that boundary by acquiescence claims 
may proceed without meeting the requirements of the statute of 
frauds and that the statute of frauds does not apply to boundary 
by acquiescence claims. The court also ruled UCA 78-12-7 relates 
to adverse possession and does not apply to boundary by 
acquiescence claims. The court refused to apply any presumption 
that applies to adverse possession to boundary by acquiescence. 
The court also refused to quiet title without trial. 
At the close of plaintiffs' case defendant moved for a 
directed verdict under URC-P, Rule 50. The court believes that 
when the trial is to the court the proper motion is under Rule 
41(b), a motion for a dismissal claiming plaintiff has shown no 
right to relief. The court took that matter under advisement and 
allowed defendant to present his evidence. 
The court heard evidence, received exhibits, heard argument 
of counsel, and is fully advised. 
LAW 
The law surrounding the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 
is confusing. The issues are between two adversaries and each 
has interests that are worthwhile. On one side is the desirable 
feature of being able to turn to recorded instruments to 
determine property rights and boundaries. On the other side is 
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the also desirable principle of allowing the peace and good order 
of society to be served by leaving at rest possible disputes over 
boundaries where there has been a recognizable physical boundary 
accepted as such for a long time period. This case highlights 
those two worthy, competing interests between what appear to the 
court to be good and decent people. 
It is the policy of Utah law under the cases to apply the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence restrictively, though it is 
not unjust in some circumstances to require property owners to 
live with what they and their predecessors have long acquiesced 
in. 
For a court to quiet title in a parcel of property on the 
basis of boundary by acquiescence the party claiming title under 
the doctrine must establish (1) occupation up to a visible line 
marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (ii) mutual 
acquiescence in the line as a boundary, (iii) for a long period 
of time, and (iv) by adjoining landowners. If the party claiming 
title under the doctrine fails to establish any one of the 
elements the boundary is defeated. The court, the Honorable 
Robert K. Hilder, has previously ruled that the final two 
elements have been established by undisputed testimony. To show 
mutual acquiescence plaintiffs must show both parties recognized 
and acknowledged a visible line and that the parties acknowledge 
the line as a demarcation between the properties. Both parties 
must have knowledge of the existence of a line as the boundary 
line. This element serves the useful and practical purpose where 
the parties are seemingly content to recognize a marked line as a 
practical boundary between them. When the parties acquiesce they 
are precluded from claiming the boundary line is not the true 
line. The landowner must recognize and treat an observable line 
such as a fence as the boundary dividing the properties. The 
acquiescence may be tacit or inferred from evidence. Even mere 
conversation between parties evidencing an ongoing dispute or an 
unwillingness by one to accept the line refutes the allegation of 
mutual acquiescence. The purpose of a fence is relevant and may 
be considered and may be determinative because both parties must 
acknowledge a particular line to be the dividing line. If the 
fence was not intended as a boundary there cannot be acquiescence 
in that fence as a boundary line. If a fence is built for 
livestock control or some other purpose and not as a boundary, it 
is not a boundary by acquiescence. Occupation of land up to a 
fence is not sufficient if the adverse owner does not acquiesce 
in the fence as a boundary. Evidence of knowledge of recorded 
deeds and instrument is not relevant in a boundary by 
acquiescence case. See Ault v. Holden, 44 P.3d 181 (Utah 2002); 
Edgell v. Canning, 916 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1999); Wilkinson Family 
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Farm v. Babcock, 993 P. 2d 229 (Utah App. 1999) ; Staker v. 
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990). 
The court finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiffs own land adjacent to defendant's land in 
Summit County. The parties land is called the Brown parcel and 
the Jorgensen parcel. The parcels are off what is called Brown's 
Canyon Road, Highway 196, between Highway 32 and Highway 40. 
2. Near the north border of the Jorgensen parcel is a fence 
which runs along what is now the disputed boundary in a 
Southeasterly direction, roughly along the Southern border of the 
Brown parcel. It runs from Highway 196, commonly known as Brown's 
Canyon Road, to a point approximately 580 feet from the road, 
then turns more easterly and runs toward the Weber River for 
approximately 1200 additional feet. See exhibit 10 for the most 
accurate showing of the property lines established by deed as 
well as the fence and ditch relevant to this case. 
3. The fence was built by the father of plaintiff Thomas 
Brown, T. Edward Brown, in the mid 1940s, between 1943 and 1946, 
though there is some testimony it was built before that. 
Plaintiff helped his father build the fence, a cedar post and net 
and barbed wire fence that requires maintenance and repair on a 
regular basis. The fence has remained in the same basic position 
since that time, but plaintiffs have repaired and replaced some 
of it as recently as the mid-1990s. There has been ongoing wire 
replacement and the first approximately 580 feet from the road 
have been replaced completely in the mid 1990s, but the old cedar 
posts were left in place. The fence has been observable since its 
construction, though at various points it may have been leaning 
down or covered by sagebrush in places. Defendant testified 
contrary to that visibility, but the court, based on several 
other witnesses testimony, finds the fence has remained 
observable and open since the mid 1940s. Several neighbors and 
friends and relatives of plaintiffs so testified and some had 
been in the area and recall the fence from the 1940s. 
4. The recorded deeds and plats show that the fence goes 
across the Jorgensen parcel and encloses approximately 6.94 acres 
of land that is shown on the deeds and plats and by certified 
surveys as belonging to Jorgensen. That area is the "subject 
property." There is no question that the fence is on land deeded 
to and platted as belonging to Jorgensen since 1979. The 
recorded property lines are not disputed by plaintiffs. In 1979 
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Jorgensen and a partner, Rowell, acquired the Jorgensen parcel 
and the partnership dissolved in 1986 and defendant acquired the 
parcel from the partnership and has owned it solely since 1986. 
The land was acquired, through a title company, from Tracy Land 
and Livestock (Tracy) who owned that land and much more in the 
area since the mid 1940s. 
5. T. Edward Brown died in 1951 and plaintiffs'' family took 
over the land and have used it to graze cattle and grow hay and 
other crops since 1951. Plaintiffs took title in some of that 
property, approximately 17 acres, in 1971, and that property is 
now known herein as the Brown parcel. He built a house on a 
portion of the approximately 17 acre parcel deeded to him. The 
fence was always considered by plaintiff to be the boundary line 
and plaintiff believed fully that the fence was the property line 
to his property and has believed that since the fence was built, 
even before plaintiff took title to his 17 acre parcel in 1971. 
Before building the house, plaintiffs commissioned a survey which 
was done by metes and bounds, performed by Bush and Gudgell. 
That document shows in fact the same as the recorded instruments, 
before and after 1971, that in fact the property line was not the 
fence line. Plaintiff was legally aware of that metes and bounds 
survey but did not understand it showed a property line different 
from the fence line constructed by his father in the 1940s. His 
subjective intent and belief, which the court finds was not 
unreasonable, was that the fence erected by his father was his 
property line. 
6. As shown more fully on exhibit 10, the fence line is up 
hill from plaintiff's true property line. Defendant's property, 
where it adjoins plaintiffs' property, is largely barren and 
hilly and mostly sagebrush. Below that fence plaintiff and his 
family have used the property to graze cattle and sheep. There 
is an irrigation ditch that plaintiff has maintained and improved 
which is below, on the downhill side of, the fence. Plaintiff has 
also caused some of that ditch to be covered by constructing 
culverts. Below that ditch there is a drop off toward the 
plaintiff property. The fence runs from the Brown's Canyon road 
up the hill, southeasterly, and then toward the river. At about 
580 feet, it turns more easterly, toward the Weber River. No one, 
neither defendant nor his predecessors, have attempted to use or 
occupy the property below the fence line. The fence runs 
approximately 1900 feet, or .3 of a mile, and if considered as 
belonging to plaintiff, adds property consisting of 6.94 acres to 
plaintiff's 17 acre parcel. At the road, the fence is 
approximately 167 feet from the true property line, that distance 
expands to approximately 250 feet approximately 500 feet from the 
road, and it then decreased to approximately 69 feet at the far 
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south end. It is thus a "strip" of property somewhat irregular 
but averaging perhaps 175 feet wide and it is approximately 1900 
feet in length. That 6.94 acres is the disputed property. An 
irrigation ditch is in the strip, and that ditch originates at 
the river and flows northward, obviously downhill, toward the 
road and then under the road. 
7. On or about July 1, 1999, defendant wrote a note to 
plaintiffs telling them they had built a fence on defendant's 
land and it should be removed. Since at least that time the 
boundary line has been in dispute. Plaintiff immediately 
contacted defendant and they attempted to resolve the issue but 
were not able to do so. Plaintiff commissioned a survey shortly 
after that contact. That informal survey is consistent with the 
1971 metes and bounds survey that was accomplished so plaintiffs 
could build their home. Plaintiff was originally told in 1994 
that in fact the true property line probably ran through his 
home, but that was in error and the true line, as shown on 
Exhibit 10, is west of plaintiff's home. Plaintiffs have refused 
to remove the fence and filed this action to guiet title 
asserting the disputed land is owned by them under the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. 
8. Defendant bought 195 acres in 1979 as an investment. He 
inspected the property and observed fence posts but the court 
finds the fence was visible. Defendant at that time was not 
aware by survey of the exact and true boundary line but he 
assumed the line was below the fence and irrigation ditch and 
utilized what he believed was a "road" on his property just below 
the irrigation ditch and envisioned that would be the access to 
his property. In fact the court finds it was not a "road" but 
was used to work along the irrigation ditch. It could be 
accessed from Brown's Canyon road but a fence and gate from 
Brown's property ran to the disputed fence approximately 500 feet 
from the road as shown on exhibit 10. 
9. The predecessors of defendant ran livestock on the land. 
There is no evidence Tracy ever saw the fence or knew of its 
existence. There was no evidence adduced whatever that Tracy 
used or occupied the land on the downhill side of the fence. 
10. Defendant took surveyors and potential buyers along that 
area of the ditch but the court finds that was not occupation of 
the land. 
11. Defendant, in anticipation of possible buyers of some of 
his land, commissioned a survey in 1994, and that survey showed 
that the true line was not the fence line. Defendant always 
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believed the true line was not the fence, which he claims he did 
not even see except for a few old leaning cedar posts, but that 
the boundary line was downhill by the ditch and by the Brown home 
where it was marked with a flag when defendant first inspected 
it. The survey he commissioned in 1994 showed he was correct 
about the true boundary line, that it was not the fence line. 
The surveys are consistent with all the recorded instruments and 
show the true boundaries as shown on Exhibit 10. That survey was 
done by one France, who talked with plaintiff about the results 
of that survey, along with the real estate broker McPhie. France 
told plaintiff that plaintiff's house was probably partly on the 
Jorgensen property. That was incorrect, but plaintiff was told 
that. 
12. Plaintiff erected a wooden rail fence along the Brown's 
Canyon Road, to replace a wire fence across the front of his 
property, but ran it across the nroad" or disputed approximate 
167 feet to the disputed fence in the late 1990s. Plaintiff does 
not call that area by the ditch, the disputed area, a "road" but 
the court finds vehicles could drive onto it before the wooden 
rail fence was installed, though it was not intended as a road. 
ISSUES 
Here, as found, each party operated in good faith. In 
actual fact the true boundary line was as shown on the recorded 
records, deeds and plats. There was a 1971 survey that showed 
the fence was NOT the boundary line, but that was not understood 
by plaintiff. Thus, the issue becomes difficult for the court. 
That is especially so since two recent appellate court decisions 
are somewhat in conflict. There are recorded documents and 
surveys showing actual boundary lines. The parties are 
constructively charged with that knowledge, thus each party knew 
the boundary line and there was no legal uncertainty though there 
was practical uncertainty by plaintiff. Defendant then did 
nothing, by word or deed, to object to a visible fence. The 
issue thus becomes whether that inaction as to a fence, which was 
erected for a purpose not shown by the evidence, but by inference 
was erected not to establish a boundary line but for some other 
purpose, amounts to mutual acquiescence in that fence as a 
boundary. 
Based on the above findings and discussion, the court makes 
the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1. Plaintiffs had constructive knowledge of the true 
property line since they commissioned a survey in 1971. Prior 
deeds and documents showed the true boundary line as well. Those 
instruments showed that the true property line, according to 
deeds and plats and surveys, was not the fence line constructed 
by plaintiff's father. Plaintiff believed, however, that the 
fence line was the demarcation of the property line. 
2. Defendant is the record title owner of the disputed land. 
He also had constructive knowledge of the true property line at 
least since 1994 when he commissioned a survey of his property. 
He had constructive knowledge since 1979 when he obtained a deed 
with the property description. That 1994 survey showed the 
property line not to be where the fence was but the true property 
line was according to the deeds and plats of record. 
3. Plaintiff has operated under the assumption that the 
fence constructed in the 1940s by his father was in fact the 
property line. 
4. The fence has been open and notorious and visible since 
the 1940s. It has on occasion been in disrepair but has been an 
observable fence since that time. 
5. Plaintiff used and occupied the land as if it were his 
and was open and notorious about that use. The fence has served 
as an observable and open boundary for a long period of time 
between two adjoining land owners. The topography and terrain 
made the fence placement a practical place to erect a fence as it 
would keep cattle and sheep off of the irrigation ditch and the 
lower drop off and off of what was in the 1940s pasture land, 
until the home was built in 1971. Given the slope and the 
irrigation ditch and the terrain in the area the court infers and 
concludes that the purpose of the fence was to contain livestock 
and keep grazing livestock of the predecessor owner from the 
Brown property. The fence was not intended as a boundary line 
demarcating the property. There has been occupation of the land 
by plaintiffs up to the fence. There has been no occupation by 
defendant or his predecessors below or east of that fence. 
Defendant's occupation, and that of his predecessors, has been 
only up to that disputed fence. 
6. There was no mutual acquiescence in the open boundary 
line of the fence. This area is rural and defendant visited only 
on occasion as he bought the land for investment purposes. He 
purchased 195 acres and had possible plans to subdivide the area. 
There was no acquiescence in the fence as a boundary. Defendant 
did not take any action to oust plaintiff and remained silent as 
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relates to plaintiff until 1999. However, defendant did 
commission a survey in 1994. To the court that indicates a lack 
of acquiescence. If acquiescence is, in the words of Ault v. 
Holden, "where adjoining landowners are seemingly content to 
recognize a marked line or monument not on the true line as the 
practical boundary between them," then the hiring of a survey to 
the court conveys the opposite of acquiescence. If defendant 
believed and acquiesced in the notion that the fence was the 
boundary, he would not have commissioned a survey in this rural 
area. That act, though not conveyed directly to plaintiff, shows 
a lack of acquiescence. That act showed an unwillingness to 
accept the fence as the property line. In fact, however, even if 
the surveyor, Wallace France, was not an agent of defendant, that 
fact of obtaining the survey was conveyed to plaintiff. Moreover, 
the court concludes it need not have been conveyed to the 
opposing landowner to evidence a lack of acquiescence, or 
unwillingness to accept the fence as a boundary line. 
Plaintiffs have to prove mutual acquiescence by a preponderance 
of the evidence. Plaintiff argued that unless defendant conveyed 
that lack of acquiescence to plaintiff there was acquiescence. 
The court disagrees. While most cases evidently show a dispute by 
a direct communication with the opposing landowner, the court 
concludes that any actions that show an unwillingness to 
acknowledge the fence as a boundary are sufficient to defeat the 
doctrine. The acquiescence includes plaintiff demonstrating that 
both parties "recognized and acknowledged" a visible line. Ault 
v. Holden, 44 P. 3d at 13. Defendant's actions in commissioning a 
survey were inconsistent with an "acknowledgment" that the fence 
was the property line. There seems to be no good reason that the 
lack of acknowledgment is only effective if conveyed to the 
opposing landowner. The doctrine requires that there be an 
actual acknowledgment, and that the parties treat the fence as a 
common boundary between the properties. Telling others that the 
fence is not the boundary, or hiring a surveyor, seems to the 
court to defeat the idea that there is an acknowledgment in a 
boundary line. As mentioned, moreover, here plaintiff was aware 
in 1994 there was a dispute when France and McPhie talked to him 
about the property line being other than at the disputed fence 
line. 
Further, the seeming inaction of defendant was not shown to 
be a tacit approval of the fence as boundary line. The inaction 
of defendant and his predecessors was acquiescence in the fence 
line for some purpose, but plaintiff has not shown it was an 
acquiescence in the fence line as a boundary line. 
The court believes plaintiff's arguments seek to in effect 
reduce the elements of boundary by acquiescence from four to 
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three. Simple occupation of land, up to a visible fence or 
boundary, without more, is not acquiescence. Though acquiescence 
may be tacit, it must be more than has been shown here by 
plaintiff. 
As to the predecessor acquiescing, the court rejects 
plaintiff's arguments in that regard. First, plaintiff must show 
acquiescence, which requires a showing that the other landowner, 
defendant's predecessor Tracy, "recognized and acknowledged" the 
visible line. There may be an inference that Tracy, running 
livestock, saw the fence, but the court concludes that is 
insufficient to show Tracy even saw ("recognized") the fence, let 
alone acknowledged it as a boundary line. The four elements do 
not overlap. Failure to occupy by Tracy, coupled with occupation 
by plaintiff, does not amount to acknowledgment the fence is a 
boundary. 
7, The boundary by acquiescence elements have not been met. 
There has been occupation of the land by plaintiffs up to B 
visible mark (fence) for a long period of time, over 20 years, by 
adjoining land owners, but plaintiffs have not shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was mutual acquiescence 
by the parties in that fence as the boundary line. Defendant 
failed to oust plaintiff, but did not agree that the fence was 
the boundary. Moreover, given the court's conclusion about the 
action of defendant in 1994 amounting to a dispute because of a 
failure to acknowledge the fence as a line, there has not even 
been an undisputed period of 20 years since defendant's 
ownership. 
The court indicated the recent cases are confusing. In 
Wilkinson, a Court of Appeals decision, the court said 
specifically that knowledge of the true boundary is not 
irrelevant. However, that court then quoted language from a case 
that has in effect been overruled because it considered the 
objective uncertainty element and that has now been eliminated as 
an element of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The Utah 
Supreme Court said after Wilkinson in Ault that a landowner must 
recognize and treat an observable line as the boundary, 
''regardless of whether the- landowner knows where the actual 
boundary lies or whether the boundary is uncertain." To this 
court that means that knowledge of the actual or true boundary is 
not relevant. Here, there was never any legal uncertainty as to 
the true boundary line but there was actual uncertainty. The 
court concludes that such facts as these do not allow the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence to grant an interest in 
property. The knowledge of the parties as to the true boundary 
lines is not relevant under Ault since the elimination of the 
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objective uncertainty element. 
The appearances of this area, the terrain, and the nature of 
the land and its uses by the parties do not allow a resident to 
obtain land by merely constructing a fence and then merely 
because the absentee landowner does nothing to have the fence 
removed claim title to the area up to the fence. The court has 
no question that plaintiffs predecessors did not intend to 
"appropriate" the land in this way, nor is there any evidence the 
fence was erected for any improper purpose. The clear inference 
is that the fence was erected to contain livestock and protect a 
ditch, and not to establish a boundary line. The plaintiffs' 
predecessors' record deeds also showed the actual boundary lines 
of the properties. Plaintiff has not shown that defendant or his 
predecessors mutually acquiesced for 20 years in this fence as a 
property line. 
8. The statute of frauds does not apply in this case. The 
statute of frauds, UCA 25-5-1, allows creation of an interest in 
land by "operation of law." The doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence is the operation of law. If plaintiff had prevailed 
in showing all elements of that doctrine an interest in land 
could be acquired by operation of law without a writing. 
Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is denied. The court 
orders that quiet title be awarded to defendant as in the 
recorded instruments. 
Defendant is to prepare an order in compliance with URCP, 
Rule 7(f) setting forth this ruling. 
DATED this /* day of /^r7/^(/f 2004. 
BRUCE C. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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ADDENDUM III 
Brown's April 14,2004 Objection to Proposed Order 
Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and 
Request for Hearing (R. 493-495) 
Ho,. 
•FIJIL-E-D 
APR "15 m 
B y ^ . J ^ ' ^ ^ ^ . w Court 
:County' ^ ^ ^ E s u m n w i 
James C. Jenkins (#1658) 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 West Center 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone: (435) 752-1551 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR., and 
MARILYN R.BROWN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; JOHN DOES 1-10; 
and Other Persons Unknown Claiming 
Title or Interest in the Subject Property of 
this Action, 
Defendant. 
OBJECTION TO PROPOSED 
ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO 
REAL PROPERTY IN LEE 
JORGENSEN AND 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Civil No. 010600152 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
GAN, P C 
U" LAW 
NTER 
525 
323 0525 
1551 
OFFICE 
MAIN 
1 15 
AH 84337 
3885 
Plaintiffs, by and through James C. Jenkins, object to the proposed Order Quieting Title to 
Real Property in Lee Jorgensen (the "Proposed Order") received by the undersigned on behalf of 
Plaintiffs on the 12th day of April, 2004, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
Plaintiffs objections are as follows: 
1. Rule 54(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part "unless otherwise 
directed by the Court, a judgment shall not include any matter by reference." Plaintiffs presume that 
Defendant's Proposed Order is intended to be a judgment as defined under Rule 54 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure which includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies. Plaintiffs object 
to the reference in the Proposed Order to findings of fact and conclusions of law having been made 
and entered by reference to the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7,2004. Rule 52 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in all actions tried upon facts without a jury, the court 
shall find the facts specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. While Rule 52 
O G G A N , P.C. 
:YS AT LAW 
T CENTER 
»OX 525 
H 84323-0525 
'52-1 551 
ON OFFICE 
\ST MAIN 
30X 115 
. UTAH 84337 
157-3885 
provides that it will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law appear in an opinion 
or memorandum decision filed by the court, Plaintiffs request that a fomial set of findings and 
conclusions be prepared to satisfy the additional objections set forth below. 
2. Plaintiffs object to the Proposed Order incorporating the metes and bounds 
descriptions because the Memorandum Decision and the Court's findings did not state nor reference 
these legal descriptions. Absent formal findings of fact which incoiporate these legal descriptions, 
the Proposed Order (judgment) violates Rule 54 by referencing matters inconsistent with the specific 
findings and conclusions of the Court. 
3. Plaintiffs object to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Proposed Order on the grounds that the 
Court made no findings with reference to the removal offences, nor did the Memorandum Decision 
suggest that such relief was to be granted. 
4. Plaintiffs object to paragraph 4 of the Proposed Order on the grounds that such 
paragraph violates Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that costs may not be awarded 
absent the procedure of Defendant first filing a memorandum of costs and allowing the Plaintiffs 
prior notice and an opportunity to challenge such memorandum of costs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs hereby obj ect to the entry of Defendant's Proposed Order Quieting 
Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and additionally hereby request a hearing on these objections. 
DATED this A^day of April, 2004. 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
James C. Jenkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 14 day of April, 2004,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO PROPOSED ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 
IN LEE JORGENSEN AND REQUEST FOR HEARING, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to 
the following: 
Ray G. Martineau 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
David S. Cook 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, UT 84010 
J:\JCJ\PLEADINGS\Brown v. Jorgensen\brown.objection.wpd 
Ray G. Martineau #2105 
Anthony R. Martineau #5859 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 486-0200 
Fax: (801)486-0383 
DavidS. Cook #0715 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-7216 
Fax:(801)292-7217 
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other 
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the 
subject property of this action, 
Defendants. 
ORDER QUIETING TITLE TO REAL 
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN 
Civil No. 010600152 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. 
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were 
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funk. 
EXHIBIT £. 
Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G. 
Martineau and David S. Cook. 
The Court having heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel and having 
taken the matter under advisement and having made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision 
dated April 7, 2004, in which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth 
therein and good cause appearing, 
The Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to said Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is 
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and jfree and clear of all boundary by acquiescence 
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all 
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or 
either of them: 
PARCEL A: 
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the 
Northwest comer of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest corner bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest 
corner and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209 
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East 
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius 
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of 
40°55,31", a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian; 
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast 
comer of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the 
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast 
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East 
line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.645 feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels: 
Exception Parcel 1: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South, 
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly 
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning; 
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING. 
Exception Parcel 2: 
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Slat Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said 
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains; 
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL B: 
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section corner of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5 
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING. 
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the 
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property which was claimed by Plaintiffs 
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA corner of Section 15, 
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 
17°27'22" East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said 
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56'1 West 15.81 feet to a fence corner; thence South 
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31 '35" East 28.89 feet along said 
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24" 
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said 
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; Ihence North 
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet alone said fence- thence North 41°00'52" West 581 67 feet 
to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a 
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25'19" 
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown deed line; thence South 
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed 
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20 
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres. 
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. having erected a wood fence obstructing access from 
the Brown's Canyon Road into the North portion of the above described Lee Jorgensen property 
without Lee Jorgensen's consent and having been requested to remove the same by Defendant 
Lee Jorgensen, Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove all 
portions of said wood fence which traverses property of Lee Jorgensen. 
3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. having erected a wire and steel post fence along the hillside in 
the Lee Jorgensen property without Lee Jorgensen's consent and having been requested to 
remove the same by Lee Jorgensen, Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to 
forthwith remove said fence. 
4. Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court 
incurred herein as may hereafter be established by the filing of a memorandum of costs and 
disbursements pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
MADE AND ENTERED this day of , 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Rmce C. Lubeck 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order Quieting Title To Real 
Property In Lee Jorgensen was served upon the following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage 
prepaid, to said individuals at the following address this 7 day of April, 2004. 
James C. Jenkins 
Robert B. Funk 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
88 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
<v 
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ADDENDUM IV 
July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order (R. 565-567) 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, JR. et.al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN, et.al. 
Defendants. 
RULING and ORDER 
Case No. 010600152 
Honorable BRUCE C. LUBECK 
Date: July 15, 2004 
The above matter came before the court July 12, 2004, for 
argument on a proposed order and on plaintiffs motion to amend 
the pleadings. The court tried this matter March 31, 2004, and 
April 1, 2004. The court issued a ruling and order and asked 
defendant to prepare an order. Defendant did so and plaintiff 
objected to that proposed order, defendant responded, and the 
court set the matter for argument. On June 15, 2004, plaintiff 
filed a motion to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence. 
Defendant opposed that motion on July 7, 2004, and plaintiff 
replied on July 9, 2004. The court briefly heard argument on the 
motion and took the matter under advisement. 
The court is of the belief that the order prepared by 
defendant should be signed with slight modification. 
The court's ruling was based entirely on plaintiff's claim 
to title of the disputed land based solely on a claim of boundary 
by acquiescence and defendant's counterclaim to quiet title. The 
trial was over who owns title to the land in dispute. 
Plaintiff now claims the court can and should allow the 
pleadings to be amended because other issues were tried by 
express or implied consent. Plaintiff now claims that the court 
can and should determine that the evidence established that 
plaintiff has a prescriptive easement in the disputed land. 
Plaintiff claims the evidence showed plaintiff and his family 
have used and maintained the disputed property and they thus have 
a prescriptive easement for that continued use. 
The court's ruling was NOT based on the doctrine of 
prescriptive easement. The evidence to be presented at a any 
trial concerning any boundary dispute on any theory, be it 
dealing with an easement, adverse possession, or boundary by 
acquiescence, would be similar. Evidence would be presented 
concerning actual title, surveys, deeds, use of the land and the 
manner of that use, and so on. The court does not view this trial 
as one where the parties agreed, explicitly or implicitly, on a 
trial concerning prescriptive easement or any other cause of 
action other than title under boundary by acquiescence. That 
phrase "prescriptive easement" was not uttered during the trial 
to the court's recollection, and it certainly was not briefed nor 
argued, and the court did not make its decision based on the 
doctrine. Whether the evidence "supported" such a claim is not 
the question for the court at this point. It may well have 
support the claim had the claim been made. It may not. That is 
the problem and issue. Had defendant been given a chance to 
address and challenge the theory of plaintiff now advanced, the 
court has no idea what the facts would have shown and what legal 
conclusions may be drawn from the facts presented. Prescriptive 
easement mostly focuses on "use" of land. There was indeed 
testimony on use by plaintiff, but defendant did not focus on 
that because the focus was on who had title to the land. 
Defendant has the right to know what claims he is defending 
against. Defendant was defending against a claim of plaintiff 
that plaintiff had title to this property under a property law 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. The court did not 
understand, and defendant did not understand, that the evidence 
was aimed at establishing an easement of any kind in favor of 
plaintiff. The evidence was presented by plaintiff and by 
defendant to convince the court that either plaintiff or 
defendant had title to the disputed land. The court decided who 
had title. The court did not attempt to nor did it decide 
anything else. 
Plaintiff filed this case in May, 2001, asserting title to 
land under one doctrine, boundary by acquiescence. Plaintiff 
could have alleged alternate theories of title and easement, or 
plaintiff could have amended the pleadings long ago. The court 
believes the matter could have been tried on alternate theories, 
but if so, defendant could have faced and challenged each or 
either. Defendant did not defend against a claim of easement and 
usage by plaintiff and the court did not decide such. Defendant 
did not amount a defense to the "use" and "continuous" aspects of 
prescriptive easement law because he did not know plaintiff was 
claiming that. Whether there are defenses to such facts as 
plaintiff could present is, of course, unknown. That is why the 
court cannot decide if plaintiff has a viable case for a 
prescriptive easement based on the facts the parties presented. 
The court believes it would be fundamentally unfair to allow 
plaintiff to now seek recovery of a different sort, on a 
different cause of action seeking certain permissive use rather 
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than title, from what was asked for in the pleadings. 
Accordingly, the court will DENY the motion to amend the 
pleadings. 
The court will also direct that defendant prepare a slightly 
modified order based on the trial. 
The ruling and order of the court may not have set forth the 
boundaries of the land but the evidence established without any 
real dispute where the deeds and surveys drew the property line. 
The court orders that the ruling and order be amended to include 
the property description as set forth in the proposed final order 
quieting title as the court finds that description is an accurate 
description of the properties involved. 
The court also 
the fences put in pi 
seemed to the court 
determined that the 
deeds in evidence, 
retain fences plaint 
The order requiring 
fence was installed 
The improvement, by 
many years is also t 
did not indicate in its ruling formally that 
ace by plaintiff must be taken down. It 
that went without saying. The court has 
property line is according to the surveys and 
It makes no sense to allow plaintiff to 
iff built on property belonging to defendant, 
removal of the fence along the roadway, which 
by plaintiff is to be removed by plaintiff, 
plaintiff, to the fence line in existence for 
o be removed by plaintiff. 
Defendant is to prepare a new order with the above 
modifications and the court will sign such order. 
The court has attempted to follow the law in this matter. 
The result is not one that appears "fair" in all respects, but it 
is one wherein the court has followed the law as best it can and 
the result follows. If the court believed that the law did not 
answer the questions presented and it could turn to equity, the 
result may be different. However, the court believes the legal 
principles set forth in its ruling and order are correct and this 
result follows. 
DATED this day of 2004 
^UCEM:. LUBECK 
DISTRICT COURT JUDG^fe^T^ 
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ADDENDUM V 
August 2, 2004 Judgment Quieting Title to Real 
Property in Lee Jorgensen and Directing Removal of 
Fence/Fence Improvements (R. 569-573) 
Ray G. Martineau #2105 
Anthony R. Martineau #5859 
3098 Highland Drive, Suite 450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801)486-0200 
Fax: (801)486-0383 
DavidS. Cook #0715 
85 West 400 North 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Telephone: (801) 292-7216 
Fax:(801)292-7217 
Attorneys for Defendant Lee Jorgensen 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS E. BROWN, Jr. and MARILYN R. 
BROWN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEE JORGENSEN; John Does 1-10; and other 
persons unknown claiming title or interest in the 
subject property of this action, 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE TO REAL 
PROPERTY IN LEE JORGENSEN AND 
DIRECTING REMOVAL OF FENCE/FENCE 
IMPROVEMENTS 
Civil No. 010600152 
Judge Bruce C. Lubeck 
The above entitled matter was tried before the Court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck presiding, on 
March 31 and April 1, 2004. 
The Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown appeared in person and were 
represented by attorneys James C. Jenkins and Robert B. Funic. 
Nfl. 
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Defendant Lee Jorgensen appeared in person and was represented by his attorneys Ray G. 
Martineau and David S. Cook. 
The Court heard and considered the evidence and the arguments of counsel, took the matter 
under advisement and made and entered the Court's Memorandum Decision dated April 7, 2004, in 
which the Court made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set forth therein and ordered that 
quiet title be awarded to Defendant as in the recorded instruments and directed Defendant to prepare an 
order in compliance with URCP, Rule 7(f) setting forth the Court's ruling. 
By Objection to Proposed Order Quieting Title to Real Property in Lee Jorgensen and Request 
for Hearing dated April 14, 2004, Plaintiffs objected to the form of order quieting title in Lee Jorgensen 
prepared by Defendant. 
On or about June 10, 2004 Plaintiffs filed Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Motion to Amend Pleadings to 
Conform to the Evidence; Motion to Amend Findings of the Court; and Motion to Alter or Amend the 
Court's Memorandum Decision and Request for Hearing and a memorandum in support of the said 
motions. 
Defendant filed memorandums responding to Plaintiffs' April 10, 2004 objection and June 10, 
2004 motions and those matters were heard by the Court on July 12, 2004. 
By Ruling and Order dated July 15, 2004, the Court denied Plaintiffs June 10, 2004 motions for 
the reasons set forth in that Ruling and Order; ruled the Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision 
amended to include the property description as set forth in Defendant's proposed order, finding such to 
be an accurate description of the properties involved, ruled that Plaintiff is to remove the fence installed 
by Plaintiff along the roadway and the improvements made by Plaintiff to the fenceline which has been 
in existence for many years and directed Defendant to prepare a new order with those modifications. 
NOW THEREFORE, the Court now makes and enters the following judgment pursuant to the 
Court's April 7, 2004 Memorandum Decision and the Court's July 15, 2004 Ruling and Order: 
1. Fee simple title to all of the following described real property should be and the same is 
hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen against and free and clear of all boundary by acquiescence 
and all other claims of Plaintiffs Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown and of all claims of all 
other persons who may claim by, through or under Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown or 
either of them: 
PARCEL A: 
BEGINNING at a point that is due South 3896.809 feet and due East 19,394.098 feet from the 
Northwest corner of Section 18, Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Summit County, Utah (said Northwest comer bearing North 1°06'56" West from the Southwest 
comer and being the basis of bearing for this description) thence North 35°30' West 1641.209 
feet to a point on the Southerly right of way line of State Highway 196; thence North 43°42' East 
along said right of way line 1101.410 feet to a point of tangency with a 1095.916 foot radius 
curve; thence Northeasterly along the arc of said curve to the right through a central angle of 
40°55'3r', a distance of 837.778 feet to a point on the West line of the Southeast quarter of the 
Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base Meridian; 
thence leaving said right of way line South 2°28'33" East along said West line to the Southeast 
corner of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15; thence East along the 
South line of the Southeast quarter of the Northeast quarter of said Section 15 to the Northeast 
corner of the Southeast quarter of said Section 15; thence South 2°30'40" East along the East 
line of said Southeast quarter 1297.974 feet; thence South 86° West 1922.64S feet to the point of 
BEGINNING. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM the following described parcels: 
Exception Parcel 1 : 
BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of the Southeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 South, 
Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; running thence West 211 feet; thence Southeasterly 
703 feet, more or less, to a point on the Section line 671 feet South of the place of beginning; 
thence North 671 feet to the place of BEGINNING. 
Exception Parcel 2: 
A tract situated in the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast comer of the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of said 
Section 15; and running thence South 11.00 chains; thence North 47°20' West 16.5 chains; 
thence East 12.42 chains to the place of BEGINNING. 
PARCEL B: 
BEGINNING 4.7 chains West of the East quarter Section comer of Section 15, Township 1 
South Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence West 15.3 chains; thence North 9.5 
chains; thence South 58°10' East 18.02 chains, more or less, to the place of BEGINNING. 
Said real property, title to which is hereby quieted in Defendant Lee Jorgensen, includes the 
following described 6.94-acre parcel of Lee Jorgensen's property wliich was claimed by Plaintiffs 
Thomas E. Brown, Jr. and Marilyn R. Brown in this proceeding under the doctrine of boundary by 
acquiescence: 
Beginning at a point which is West 211.00 feet from the East lA comer of Section 15, 
Township 1 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence South 
\T2T2T East 19.40 feet to a fence; thence South 64°52'21" West 25.75 feet along said 
fence to a gate; thence South 59°33'56" West 15.81 feet to a fence comer; thence South 
6°04'49" East 67.61 feet along a fence; thence South 3°31'35" East 28.89 feet along said 
fence; thence North 38°57'12" West 58.36 feet along said fence; thence North 70°47'24" 
West 53.17 feet along said fence; thence North 67°20'36" West 573.54 feet along said 
fence; thence North 67°15'37" West 356.37 feet along said fence; thence North 
67°04'47" West 279.80 feet along said fence; thence North 41°00'52" West 581.67 feet 
to the Southerly right-of-way line of Brown's Canyon Road; thence along the arc of a 
curve to the right 167.18 feet (radius 1103.16 feet, long chord bearing North 60°25,19" 
East 167.02 feet) along said right-of-way to the Tom Brown dttd line; thence South 
47°20'00" East 748.14 feet along said deed line, thence North 33.00 feet along said deed 
line; thence South 58°10'00" East 1189.32 feet along said deed line; thence East 99.20 
feet along said deed line to the point of beginning. Containing 6.94 acres. 
2. Plaintiff Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the 
wood fence erected by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along Brown's Canyon Road in a portion of the 
above described Lee Jorgensen property. 
3. Thomas E. Brown, Jr. is hereby ordered and directed to forthwith remove the wire and 
fence post improvements installed by Thomas E. Brown, Jr. along part of the fence along the 
hillside in a portion of the Lee Jorgensen property. 
4. Defendant Lee Jorgensen should be and he is hereby awarded his costs of court 
incurred herein as may hereafter be established by a memorandum of costs and disbursements 
filed pursuant to Rule 54(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
MADE AND ENTERED this ^ day of I—y^ r— _, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
Bruce C. Lubeck 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
. A ^ # ' 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment Quieting Title To Real 
Property hi Lee Jorgensen And Directing Removal Of Fence/Fence Improvements was served upon the 
following individuals by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, to said individuals at the following 
address this ^ 7 day of July, 2004. 
James C. Jenkins 
Robert B. Funk 
OLSON &HOGGAN,P.C. 
88 West Center Street 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
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